Month: January 2012
â€œWomenâ€, in Mao Zedongâ€™s memorable phrase, â€œhold up half the skyâ€. While not strictly the case in the business world, Chinese women do play a far more prominent role, both in starting and running big companies in China, than their sisters do elsewhere, particularly in the US and Europe.
According to a study last year by accounting firm Grant Thornton,Â women hold 34% of the senior management positions in China, compared to an average of 20% elsewhere in the world. The percentages are also moving in opposite directions, with a greater proportion of top jobs in China going to women recently. Women held 31% of management jobs in China in 2009. Meantime, women are becoming less common in senior management in Europe and US, down from 24% over the same period.
And, no, itâ€™s not just a case of women dominating â€œsoft functionsâ€ like HR and accounting, as they often tend to do in the West. In China, 19% of women in management roles are serving as CEOs, compared to 8% elsewhere. A significant quotient of partners at private equity firms in China are women. The most talented and capable person in investment banking in China I know, Wang Yansong, Â is female — even better, she works with me.
If there is a â€œglass ceilingâ€ in China, it must be quite porous.
In my three-plus years in China, Iâ€™ve met far more successful big-time women entrepreneurs and bosses than I did in 25 years working in US and Europe. Iâ€™ve also been lucky enough to work with several, including one of Chinaâ€™s most well-known entrepreneurs, Mrs. He Yongzhi, the founder of the countryâ€™s largest spicy hotpot restaurant chain, å°å¤©é¹…, or â€œLittle Cygnetâ€, with over 400 high-end restaurants across China.
Mrs. HeÂ started the business 30 years ago in a tiny alcove, with just five tables –no capital, no powerful backers and a competitor on every street corner. And yet, she has thrived. She invented the now-ubiquitous “yin-yang” twin-flavored stock pot commonly used not just in her own restaurant but in hotpot restaurants around the country.
Along with the restaurant chain, she also runs a food processing company, producing bottled hot sauces with her face on every label, and a large commercial real estate business, including five hotels in Chongqing, Sichuan and Tibet. Her daughter Weijia is a chip off the entrepreneurial block,Â having started a high-end tea business called NenlÃ¼.
Mrs.Â He’s Â restaurant company has Sequoia Capital as an investor, and is planning an IPO next year that will likely make her into another of Chinaâ€™s self-made billionairesses. Already, half of the worldâ€™s self-made billionaires are from China. Over 10% of the richest businesspeople in China are women. That may not sound like much, but is light-years ahead of most every place in the world. In a typical working year, I will meet at least 10 women bosses who are well on the way to building an enormous fortune as founder and majority-owner of companies thatÂ may likely one day have an IPO in China.
Indeed, itâ€™s one of the great joys of my working life, that I meet so many great â€œlady laobanâ€, as we call them, using the Chinese word for “boss”. I especially like meeting with women running metal-bashing businesses.Â One of the more successful and elegant women bosses I know started and runs one of Chinaâ€™s largest private auto parts companies, making aluminum ventilation and heating systems for cars and large trucks.
At the factory, she wears a smock with the cotton elbow-protectors once in vogue among 19th century English bookkeepers. Her husband works for her, as head of the security team. Her likely successor? Her one daughter, a recent new mom, who runs the company in tandem with her mother. Both mother and daughter are warm, lovely, attractive, fully at ease talking to truck mechanics and engineers, or walking the factory floor.
It may be a coincidence, but many of the women bosses I know do not have sons. Only daughters. Did they work harder in their professional lives to overcome the stigma (then large, now thankfully smaller) of having only girl children? It could be. But, such Western-style psychological theorizing seems misplaced. China has more great women entrepreneurs because 30 years ago, as China was ending its costly experiment with Maoist socialism, there were new huge areas of money-making opportunity open to all.Â Gender mattered less than ambition, diligence, persuasiveness, businessÂ acumen and leadership skills. China after 1978 was a commercial â€œtabula rasaâ€. There were few established business rulesÂ and basically no role models (positive or negative) for anyone to follow.
China traditionally is a male-focused society, with deep-set roots in Confucian thinking that put husbands and sons well above the rank of wives and daughters. In many ways, this mindset still persists in China. And yet, paradoxically,Â a society that puts men on a higher social plane can also provide women entrepreneurs with something of a level playing field in business.
In the last year, along with the two lady bosses already mentioned, Iâ€™ve met women who started and now run successful companies that make high-end LED screens, lease cars, provide an online B2B transaction platform, make and export embroidered blankets to Williams Sonoma. Never once have I heard a complaint about gender-discrimination or even a hint that the company has been victimized by negative perceptions about female bosses.
In the end, starting a company anywhere requires a tolerance of — if not full bear hug embrace of — risk. Women, so Iâ€™ve read, are programmed from birth to shun risk. Itâ€™s meant to be the reason there are comparatively few women combat soldiers and motorcycle riders, as well as successful entrepreneurs.
Gender theorists obviously never looked closely at China. Equally, Chinese women werenâ€™t taught why they were destined by biology to underperform men in the workplace, to start fewer businesses, to climb high on fewer corporate ladders. Spared knowledge of these â€œfactsâ€, theyâ€™re in full pursuit of their dreams and ambitions.
No large Chinese company is more scrutinized, criticized, ostracized and demonized than Huawei, the Shenzhen-based manufacturer of telecommunications equipment. With revenues of $28 billion in 2010, and 110,000 employees, Huawei is the second-largest telecom equipment company in the world, along with being the largest and most prominent private technology company in China. It is also said to enjoy significant behind-the-curtain support from senior figures in the Chinese government and military.
Not muchÂ is known about the secretive company. But for all its size and prominence in the telecommunications industry, Huaweiâ€™s corporate finances and balance sheet may be a good deal weaker than commonly assumed. The problem comes from Huaweiâ€™s unbalanced balance sheet, and an over-reliance on loans from Chinese state-owned banks, rather than payments from customers, to finance its business. In 2011, instead ofÂ too much help from the Chinese government, Huawei seems to have suffered from a lack of it.
The bigger Huawei has grown, the more criticism it has attracted. Competitors outside China have loudly claimed the company was a front for the Chinese military, and that it owes its size in large part to an efficient process of stealing othersâ€™ technology and then selling its cut-price knock-off equipment within China and to telecom monopolies in the worldâ€™s poorer, most despotic countries.
Huawei has had a particularly hard time of it in the US, where it was sued in 2003 by Cisco for patent infringement. More recently, its plans to buy several US tech companies were blocked by the US government orÂ obstruction by US politicians. Some of the same politicians also blocked Huaweiâ€™s sale of some larger telecom equipment in the US by asserting, without producing any real evidence, Â Huawei equipment was used by the Chinese military for eavesdropping.
In part to counter all the criticism and alter its reputation as a technological lightweight, Huawei has been spending heavily in recent years to build large R&D centers around the world, hiring lots of PhDs, both Chinese and Western. The company is filing patents by the truckload, a total of over 50,000 at last count. In 2010, the company is said to have invested over $2 billion in R&D. According to the company, profits in 2010 were Rmb24 billion (US$3.7 billion) up from RMB18.27 billion in 2009.
But, the question still remains: is Huawei a solid high-tech company that is misunderstood and unfairly attacked by jealous competitors or attention-seeking politicians? Or, is it more of a bloated, backward and barely profitable machine-maker kept in business through hidden subsidies and support from various arms of the Chinese government?
I have no way to accurately judge, nor any particular interest in the company. I meet with Huawei people occasionally. Huawei is, after all, the largest and most prominent company in Shenzhen, where I now live. As a private company, Huawei releases limited financial information.
My sense is that Huaweiâ€™s main problem, at least at the moment, isn’tÂ technical competence, butÂ poor cash flow. This has been brought on byÂ fast-declining profit margins, slow market growth,Â erratic payments from customers in less-advanced countries where Huawei derives a significant percentage of its sales. To top it off, once compliant Chinese banks have turned stingy in extending loans. Add it up, and Huawei may currently be in much less robust financial condition than previously. A paper tiger? Probabaly not. But, it does look like a very large company with a similarly large imbalance in its financial structure.
To sell its products, Huawei must usually be the cheapest supplier. But, its costs are rising fast and some of its largest markets of late, like equipment for 3G and other high-bandwidth mobile phone systems, are no longer growing quickly. Other product areas are basically stagnant, especially for traditional fixed-line telecom switches.
Though the company has made no public announcement about its financial condition, my conversations with Huawei people suggest the company had a relatively poor year in 2011, and has run into some serious cash-flow challenges. One example: Huaweiâ€™s private equity arm, which until recently was trumpeted by Huawei as a key source of future profits and access to new leading-edge technologies, has all but shriveled up and died. Funding has been basically cut off. The cash is needed apparently to keep other parts of the business above water.
In the past, Huawei could sustain its cash flow by tapping Chinaâ€™s state-owned banks for loans. This year, the flow of loans seems to have been curtailed. One reason: Â the Chinese government has clamped down hard on all bank lending to stem rising inflation. That’s impacted most heavy borrowers in China, including, it seems, Huawei.
Chinese banks have cut back lending to Huawei, so Huawei apparently has cut back elsewhere in its business. If so, it suggests Huaweiâ€™s own cash reserves are scarce, particularly for a company its size. This is caused not only by low margins, but also because Huawei, as a private company, cannot raise money from the capital markets. Its only cushion is taking loans from Chinese banks. These loans, in turn, are dialed up or dialed down not based purely on Huaweiâ€™s creditworthiness, but also the overall credit stance of the Chinese government.
The simplest solution, a Huawei IPO, seems as a remote a possibility today as it ever was. The company does not seem ready to endure that level of public disclosure — of its murky financials, ownership, profit margins, management structure, reliance on orders and loans from Chinese government-backed entities.
Over the years, most of Huaweiâ€™s erstwhile competitors â€“ including Northern Telecom, Alcatel, Fujitsu, Siemens, AT&T â€“ have either gone out of business, or been dramatically slimmed down. Only Swedenâ€™s Ericsson has sales larger than Huawei.
In the absence of reasonable profit margins and reliable cash flow from customer purchases, Huawei has used a ready flow of Chinese bank loans to finance its operations and investment. But, those low margins also make it a challenge to repay the ever larger bank debts. Ultimately, positive cash flow needs to come from customers, not bank loans.
Whatever the situation with Huaweiâ€™s books at the moment, Iâ€™m rather sure we will not be reading financial headlines anytime soon about a cash crisis at Huawei. It is a large business,Â andÂ well-connected politically. It is also reportedly a large supplier of equipment to the Chinese military.
The large banks in China are state-owned and are routinely used to advance economic, political and social goals.Â These banks may have cut back on funding to Huawei this year, but if the company needs money to stave off more serious â€“ and public — financial problems, itâ€™s all but certain the flow of bank cash will be increased. If need be, Huawei could be put on heavy state loan intravenous support.
As Huawei has grown larger, the reliance on bank lending becomes ever more of a risk. It is, above all, a very stilted, unbalanced way for the company to manage its capital needs. A diet of too much debt and too little equityÂ often leads to corporate malnourishment.