China Private Equity

Our Partnership to Serve China’s SMEs — China First Capital and Horwath Look to Change the Game in China

China First Capital blog post -- Han mirror

China First Capital (CFC) this week announced that we’ve established a strategic partnership with Horwath Capital China (HCC), part of Crowe Horwath, one of the ten-largest international accounting firms. HCC is led by David Yu, a very impressive individual and fast becoming a good friend. David qualified both as a lawyer and a CPA, and has built HCC into a powerful financial services firm, based in Beijing, and focused largely on providing China’s SME businesses with accounting, legal and other strategic advisory services.

I wanted to spell out more of what lies behind this partnership – why we’re doing it, the strategic intent, the scale of the opportunity, and the ambitious goals we hope it will achieve. Through the partnership, our aim is to raise the level of financial services available to China’s best SMEs, to meet their specific needs. That’s a tall order, and we’re cognizant of the challenges. It’s now down to both companies to make this a reality.   

HCC are an optimal partner for China First Capital, and so we’re genuinely pleased and honored to be working with them. CFC and HCC both share that same focus on Chinese SMEs, and for the same good reason: both firms see that many of China’s best SMEs will emerge over the coming years as some of China’s most successful and dominant private companies. They won’t be “Small or Medium” for long.  

While China’s largest and most internationally-known companies tend to be partly state-owned (China Mobile, CNOOC, Sinopec), the private sector is where China’s economic future resides. By some estimates, over 70% of China’s GDP is generated by private companies. Twenty years ago, the percentage was less than 10%. That’s a remarkable transformation, unparalleled in modern economic history. Another key differentiator: China’s economy has privatized without privatization. In other words, this shift from state-owned to privately-owned economy happened not primarily because state firms were privatized. That’s the route taken in Europe, most famously in the UK, where during the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher sold to private investors previously nationalized companies like British Petroleum, British Telecom, British Gas.  

In China, privatization has played a very minor role in lowering the government’s share of GDP. Instead, China created legal and economic circumstances where private companies could form, compete and prosper.   And prosper they have. With few exceptions, the best and fastest-growing companies in China are now private ones, the SMEs that China First Capital and Horwath both work with. These SMEs are still smaller in scale than the state-owned giants. But, that will change.  

The strategic rationale behind our partnership with Horwath is to “change the game” in corporate finance and advisory services in China. The partnership’s explicit goal is to be the first in China to deliver to these strong SMEs the highest international standards of corporate financial advisory work. Together, we offer SMEs a complete platform including capital-raising, audit and M&A advisory, to assist in their continued growth, and eventual IPO listing on public stock markets.  

No other firm can offer this range of services to SMEs, at a uniformly high international level. The big investment banks and accounting firms charge too much, and generally won’t work with smaller firms. Domestic firms tend to be weak in areas such as private equity capital-raising and implementing international accounting standards that structure a Chinese company for a successful IPO.  

Just as important is what we won’t do. We won’t push a Chinese SME to go public before the right moment; we won’t put earning fees ahead of the best interests of the client. Sadly, in China, there are many, many precedents of unscrupulous or unprofessional “investment advisors” who have damaged or destroyed Chinese SMEs by pushing them to IPO too early, on the wrong market (example, the US Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board) or via an ill-structured “reverse merger”. The advisors make millions, and the SMEs never recover. 

Both David Yu and I share a similar purpose here: we think these great Chinese SMEs should have access to financial advisory services that are of a similarly high caliber to what larger companies now use.  We are not chasing fees. If so, we’d go after larger companies. We both see an opportunity to work with some outstanding SMEs that are on the verge of becoming industry leaders. If we do our part with this partnership between CFC and HCC, the SMEs reach that next level of success more quickly and efficiently than they would otherwise.

That’s the measure of success for us — not that CFC and HCC will increase their own fee income. If that happens, it should only be a result of the one thing that really matters to us: that our SME clients grow faster and stronger than their peers. 

 

 

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Intellectual Property Law in China — rule of law is replacing law of the jungle

Ming Dynasty lacquer box

Within a two-minute walk from my apartment in Shenzhen, there is ample evidence that intellectual property, particularly American, is not very well-protected in China. Nighttimes, three different vendors set up their folding tables on the main street with pirate DVDs by the carton-full, including many of the latest Hollywood releases. Cost: RMB5 each, or 73 cents each.

A little further west at the main intersection, a huge new superstore is under construction. The four-story-high signs proclaim it’s Shenzhen’s new “Official NBA Store”. But, when I emailed a friend who is one of the top executives at the NBA headquarters in New York, intending to congratulate them on their expansion in China, he emailed back to say that the NBA has no such project underway in Shenzhen. In other words, some other group is going to try to hijack the NBA logo (and most likely, when the store opens, NBA merchandise as well) and pass itself off as the genuine article, presumably making a killing along the way in basketball-crazy China. 

So far so ordinary, right? Everyone knows that China is a paradise for counterfeiters and IP thieves, right? 

Well, as is often the case in China, things are not quite as malign as they appear from the outside, in the minds of Western critics. Slowly but surely, China is taking the right steps to build a legal framework through which intellectual property – including foreign IP — can be protected in court. * 

This is very good news for all of us in the private equity and investment banking industries in China. Improved enforcement will help bring China into closer accord with the rest of the developed world in terms of IP protection. In many successful companies, intangible assets, including IP, are the most valuable item on the balance sheet. So, protecting IP is commensurate with protecting the value of a business, and so the financial interest of investors. 

There’s another key reason: some of the best private Chinese companies are developing their own successful brands in the Chinese domestic market. These Chinese brand-leaders are among the best opportunities for private equity investment, not just in China, but anywhere in the world. They face the same threats in China as foreign companies whose IP is being stolen. As the IP legal system develops, China’s own emerging brands will find it easier to defend their position in the domestic market, and shut down competitors who are ripping them off. 

One telling data point: perhaps the fastest-growing area of Chinese law – measured by billable hours among well-qualified lawyers – is in intellectual property. That’s because it’s getting much easier for companies to prevail in court against those who appropriate their logos, trademarks, designs, patents and other intellectual property. 

The court system is more and more responsive to such claims of IP theft. So, with increasing regularity, Western companies are taking action in Chinese courts. This is, without question, a positive development, and one that points the way toward a future where IP protection is more strenuously and uniformly enforced across China. 

The legal system is still evolving. At the moment, damage awards for the victor in an IP infringement case are not very high, often no more than RMB500,000 ($73,000), which is not going to be enough to discourage many of the larger-sized businesses in China that are producing and selling products that obviously rip off other companies’ IP. But, there’s often more at stake here than just the damage award. Litigation in China, as elsewhere, is costly. The victor in an IP case, in addition to the damages, will often also be awarded legal costs, meaning they can reclaim their entire legal fees from the company they’ve just defeated in cost. 

This is the real sting in the tail. Legal fees can easily reach amounts 10-20 times higher than the maximum damages. So, the victor can ultimately collect tens of millions of renminbi from the loser. In addition, of course, the losers have to swallow their own legal fees, which can be no less sizable. That sort of cumulative penalty (damages+own costs+victor’s costs) is enough to inflict a lot of pain on a company that is prospering by stealing someone else’s IP. Now, sure, collecting on a large monetary judgment in China can be a challenge. But, if the losing Chinese company is large enough, it’s hard for them to escape paying. They can’t just close up shop, and start again under another name. 

As China’s economy continues to grow robustly, more companies (including those whose success is predicated on stealing others’ IP) reach a size where they are too large and too well-established to escape the effects of such a punitive judgment. Result: some of the worst and largest IP offenders will be the first to suffer, made to bear heavy costs, or forced out of business. 

Now, of course, it’s likely going to be a very long time before the pirate DVD street vendors are put out of business. It’s not often discussed, but other countries, including the US, have similar sorts of opportunistic businessmen. I’ve been to areas of Los Angeles – usually not the nicest ones – and found guys on the street selling pirate DVDs of the latest Hollywood movies owned by studios that are headquartered less than 10 miles away. If the US can’t shut these operators down, it’s unrealistic to ask China to. 

But, the legal remedies now available – and I expect them to get even more extensive and water-tight over time –allow companies in China to act against the biggest IP thieves who do the most financial damage. This will benefit both foreign and the domestic Chinese companies now investing heavily to build their own brands and unique IP. A category of private equity investors in China will be winners also – those that back the companies now developing the brands that will one day dominate China.   

 

* I am once again indebted to Luo Ke, of Fangda Partners, and Elliott Chen of Junzejun, for sharing insights, perspective, legal knowledge. Every discussion I have with them is a joy. They always seem to provide the impetus for a blog post. 

 

 

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The Best Transaction Lawyers in China

Tang Dynasty Terracotta Horse

Lawyers get less of the credit and take more of the abuse than most other professions. They’re mainly the butt of jokes. A favorite of mine comes from Mark Twain: “It is interesting to note that criminals have multiplied of late, and lawyers have also; but I repeat myself.” 

Of course much of the most biting criticism is aimed at American lawyers, who just about outnumber the rest of the developed world’s lawyers combined. 

In China, the practice of law is still a relatively new profession. Despite having a population over four times larger than the USA, China has only one-tenth the number of lawyers. In my particular area of private equity, IPO and institutional investment, talented and experienced Chinese lawyers are exceedingly rare. 

But, as is often the case, quantity doesn’t determine quality.  I’m fortunate to work alongside some of the very best legal minds in China. Shenzhen has a particularly strong group of private equity and IPO lawyers. There are two reasons for this: first, Shenzhen is home to the first stock market opened in China. And second, this part of China has more great private entrepreneurs, per square inch of real estate, than probably anywhere else in the world. 

The following is my personal list of the best securities and private equity lawyers. I know, have worked with or have met all of them. I can give them all the fullest recommendation. They are all first-class lawyers, and first-class people. 

Along with being a credit to their profession, these lawyers are a key part of ecosystem for financing the growth of great companies in China. The lawyers are a big part of the reason why the private equity industry in China has quickly grown so large and achieved such a high rate of success, both for PE firms working here and entrepreneurs receiving the financing.

 Private Equity, IPO, Securities Lawyers, Shenzhen  (all are bilingual Chinese-English) 

  • Cao Yuhui, King & Wood, Partner. Tel: 0755 2216 3310 – The dean of PE lawyers in Shenzhen and “first among equals” on this list
  • Elliott Chen, Junzejun Law Offices,  Partner. Tel: 0755 3398 8655
  • Luo Ke, Fangda Partners. Partner. Tel: 0755 8256 0188
  • Tong Ke, Jun He Law Offices,  Partner. Tel: 0755 2587 0775
  • Zhang Jianwei, Jun He Law Offices, Partner. Tel: 0755 2584 1025
  • Jack Lai, Zhong Lun Law Firm, Partner. Tel: 0755 3320 6898

Private Equity, IPO, Securities Lawyers, Beijing (all are bilingual Chinese-English) 

  • David Yu, Horwath Capital China, CEO & Managing Director. Tel: 010 85171616 ext.386 – Lawyer and CPA, with vast knowledge, experience, deal-making prowess and integrity
  • Richard Guo, Fangda Partners. Partner, Tel: 010 6505 2775

For General Corporate Law, I can also recommend two experienced, highly-competent professionals:

  • Yang Song, Guang Dong Ruan Guan Law Firm. Partner. Tel: 0755 2901 300
  • Brian Su, Greenleaf Law Firm. Tel: 1351 058 5835

 

 

 

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Private Equity Firms in China in the Firing Line – Ratcheting Up the Criticism of Performance Ratchets

Ming Dynasty Cloisonne

In an interesting discussion this week in Shenzhen with a very smart and capable lawyer (Ke Luo of Fangda Partners), I learned about a small, but growing backlash against the Top Tier private equity firms working China. Evidently there have been some articles in the Chinese press voicing criticisms of their approach and methods, and comparing them unfavorably with Chinese domestic investment companies. 

Upfront disclosure: we choose to work only with the 70 or so Top Tier private equity firms active in China, as we believe they are the best investors for companies with the greatest potential, adding more value, beyond just capital, than any other source of investment. 

A main point of contention: the ratchet and performance provisions of most of the top private equity investment deals in China (and everywhere else in the world). These are the provisions, incorporated into the final closing share purchase agreement, through which the PE firm gains greater ownership in a company they’ve invested in if the company fails to meet previously agreed revenue, profit or margin targets.   

It’s a penalty for underperformance. And a very effective and focusing one. It’s not uncommon for these ratchets provisions to specify that the PE firm can gain an additional 10-15% ownership, at no additional cost,  in a company that fails to meet the annual targets. 

In good economic times and in solidly-run companies, ratchet provisions are very rarely put into effect. So, they are a generally just a ghoulish contingent presence in every PE investment contract, the stick that compliments the carrot of a PE firm investing in your business. I know from personal experience that the concept can seem very off-putting – even frightening – to some Chinese bosses: that the PE firm will, for example, go from owning 25% of his company to 40% of his company if the owner has one year that falls below the projected levels of profit and revenue. 

We’re not in good economic times at the moment, so it’s a certainty that more ratchet provisions will be triggered this year. This is what is behind some of the complaining in the Chinese press about international PE firms. Chinese investment firms apparently don’t often include ratchet provisions. The implication of the articles is that a Chinese company is better off taking money from a Chinese investment company, and so free itself from the possibility of a sort of “takeover by stealth”, as the PE firm’s ownership ratchets upward with each year of under-target performance. 

On the surface, ratchet provisions are a very fat, very easy target. So, no surprise some in the Chinese press are attacking them. But, it’s a very incomplete, unfair – and even financially illiterate – criticism to say that because of performance ratchet provisions, a Chinese company is better off taking money from a Chinese investment company. 

Chinese investment firms may not use performance ratchets, but they have a variety of other serious weaknesses. Believe me, I’m no fan of ratchets of any kind, and work hard in negotiations with PE firms to eliminate their potential for causing harm to our clients’ businesses.  But, I still think, in almost all cases, a good Chinese private company is far better off taking money from a reputable PE firm than from a more loosely-run Chinese investment business. 

The reasons are many. But, the most deep-seated are based on an appreciation of what an outside investor can and should provide a strong Chinese SME company besides just capital. Money, famously, all spends the same. So, taking $10mn from a rich uncle or from a leading private equity firm is no different, in terms of what the money can buy – a new factory perhaps, or expanded marketing and sales, or an acquisition. 

The key difference is that the best PE firms are going to do a lot more than just write a check and then wait for the riches to flow three years later at IPO. They are going to get deeply involved assisting the company to improve all areas of its operations, implementing best practices in areas like financial accounting and corporate governance, as well as providing real expertise on hard core sales and operational issues. They also know, from past successful experience, how best to guide a private company towards a successful IPO, whether on China’s domestic stock market, or abroad.

A Chinese investment company, from what I can gather, does not have the experience, the management talent – or even the inclination – to be involved in such a detailed fashion with the companies it invests in. 

I believe, based on my own practical experience,  that the good PE firms often really do make a significant difference inside a company, enabling it to get further faster than it otherwise would. Of course, PE firms can be a pain to work with. This goes way beyond the potential for a ratchet provision to be triggered. The good PE firms act as fiduciaries for their Limited Partners, and so require a massive amount of due diligence before investing, and no less enormous information flows (generally on financial performance) after an investment is made. They want quarterly board meetings, and often hold veto rights on any spending above $500,000 or so. 

But, in return, the PE firm will go to the furthest limits of its collective abilities to make sure the Chinese company succeeds above and beyond even what the boss of that company could expect. A domestic Chinese investment company? Most likely, they have had little experience with leading good companies toward successful IPOs, little operational knowledge, little desire to commit so thoroughly to adding value inside a company. 

So, yes, performance ratchet provisions are nasty. However, they should never come into effect – if the company and the PE firm are doing everything in their power to keep the business growing. The PE firms, contrary to the way it may appear, do not  want performance ratchets triggered any more than the company’s owner does. It’s also going to reflect badly on the PE firm’s judgment and abilities, and so make it harder for them to continue to raise money for future investment.

In other words, every time a performance ratchet is triggered, it gets harder for that PE firm to continue to thrive. They would rather own a smaller share of a solid company that’s meeting its targets, than a bigger share of one that isn’t.

 

Chinese Language Report on Private Equity in China 2009: 中国的私募股权投资与战略并购

Following on from the publication of the China First Capital report, 2009 Private Equity and Strategic M&A Transactions in China — A Preview , the Chinese version is now completed. It’s more than just a change in language.

It incorporates a different but complimentary perspective to the English report, one enriched by the deep knowledge, insights and experience of my China First Capital colleague, Amy Bai. 谢谢白海鹰。

Here’s the first section. 

China First Capital Chinese language report on Private Equity, Venture Capital in China 2009

 

 

概  览chinese-balance

 

危机创造机遇

2008 年对于中国是不平凡的一年。2008年带给我们骄傲和欢乐,也带给我们挫折和悲伤。北京奥运会使我们感到前所未有的骄傲和自豪。刚刚战胜了冰冻灾害的我们又遭遇了汶川大地震。

从经济领域来看,2008年同样也是不平凡的一年。在年初,上海、深圳和香港的股市都出现了长势良好的喜人景象。IPO形势大好。然而,在2008年夏,股市开始暴跌 ,IPO也开始枯竭。到年底,上海、深圳和香港的股市均下跌了60%左右。 

中国的私募股权投资和风险投资出现了与股市涨跌相应的波动变化。在年初,投资活动非常活跃。上半年,私募股权投资和风险投资在中国的投资总额超过了100多亿美元。随着金融风暴的影响,私募股权投资和风险投资也放缓了在中国的投资步伐。到去年底的时候,基本上已经停止了所有投资活动。 

中国,美国和全球其他国家均以前所未有的方式采取了一系列干预措施,以期稳定经济。然而, 

当我们跨入2009年时,全球经济进入衰退期已成为不争的事实。 

大家所关心的问题是,经济复苏期何时来临?何时开始新一轮的投资比较合适?我公司愿与您们分享就上述问题的一些观点和想法。 

作为中国首创投资的董事长,凭借在资本市场,私募股权投资和商业领域20余年的经验,我经历过数次商业周期,并且成功地带领我的企业幸存了下来。例如,我曾经担任美国加州一家风险投资公司的首席执行官,目睹了网络泡沫的破灭, 当时的情形和现在类似,所有的私募股权投资活动几乎都停止了。 但是,仅仅两年以后,交易活动和企业估值又呈现回升趋势。 

所以,我们认为,就整体投资环境而言,2008年的金融风暴将会继续影响中国经济的发展,中国目前仍旧会经受各种考验。但是,对于私募股权投资、风险投资和兼并收购而言,2009年是个充满着无限机会的一年。机会与风险并存。只要你抓住了机会,成功就近在咫尺。 

2009年,企业所有人和私募股权投资公司可以期待商业主题中的下列几点。 

行业整合与“质的飞跃”

在2009年新年伊始,我们就感受到了中国经济所面临的严峻局面。经济增长速度减慢,成千的工厂倒闭和数以万计的人失业。中国许多经济领域已经出现了一种所谓“超饱和”状态,也就是很多企业在一个经济领域竞争,但是每个企业的市场份额都很小。这种情况下,中国企业进行合并的时机已经成熟。

在市场经济的自由竞争规律下,缺乏竞争力的企业会逐渐被淘汰。然而,具有竞争力的企业会不断赢取市场份额。并且,在良性循环下会不断发展壮大。产量不断提高,成本继续降低,从而,提高利润。企业将所赚取的盈余再度投到生产中以降低成本,进而形成一个良性循环。 

从消费者的角度来说,一个优秀的企业,由于其管理完善、生产效率高和销售策略适当,吸引着无数消费者。除此之外,强有力的主导品牌将会适时并购其他品牌。在这种状况下,企业间的合并已经成为不可避免的趋势。 

在中国,这种合并的势头刚刚开始。中国拥有仅次于美国的巨大的国内市场。在中国的许多纵向市场(包括金融服务,消费品,分销和物流,零售,时尚等),只要多争取一分的市场份额,销售收入就能增加上千万美元。 

通常,相对于企业所处行业,中国企业的规模都相对较小。在一些国营企业和半国营企业不占主导地位的区域,优秀民营企业抢先出击,兼并和收购其他区域内的竞争者,进而成为国内行业的领军企业。

对于投资者来说,这种帮助企业进行并购活动的机会将是空前的。企业在并购后的兴盛是投资者和企业共同期待的。即使在经济衰退期,并购案中 的优胜企业也会呈现销售收入和利润长期持续增长的现象。 

利润增长为IPO的

重现提供了平台

 

在过去的五年里,对于投资中国市场的私募股权投资者和风险投资者来说,IPO无疑是最可靠的退出途径。 

下面的图显示,IPO交易量在2007年达到了高峰。在2008年初,IPO交易量继续呈现高增长趋势。然而,到2008年的下半年,IPO交易量急转直下,直到2009 年年初。

 chart-1

 

 

众所周知, IPO市场与股票市场紧密相连。当股票市场整体表现不好时,企业发行新股票的欲望也会相应减弱。所以,只要中国股票市场和香港股票市场继续呈现薄弱趋势,IPO活动就不会呈现上升趋势。 

对于私募股权投资者和风险投资者来说,这意味着他们需要做出巨大的改变。 

为适应当前形势,私募股权投资公司和风险投资公司需要改变他们的投资方向。较之前而言,企业IPO前的短期投资机会已大大减少。换言之,私募股权投资公司或风险投资公司以18倍的估值投资于中国企业, 18个月后,再以20倍的价值发行上市的简单套利的机会已经一去不复返了。 

取而代之的是,在中国进行投资活动的私募股权投资公司应该从价值投资者的角度考虑他们在中国的投资,而不是从套利的角度去衡量他们在中国的投资。这说明了,私募股权投资公司在中国寻找目标企业时,应以企业的长远高回报为目标注入投资基金。 

企业的利润增长为中国市场的IPO重现提供了平台。具体而言,私募股权投资的重点应该集中在帮助企业提高运作效率和利润率上。 

这是一个值得强调的财务理念,尤其是在现今中国。企业估值归根结底是一个与公司盈利能力相关的函数,而不是一个投资者愿意为公司盈利能力而支付的价格函数。在市盈率倍数的公式中,“收益”部分是关键,而不是“价格”部分。在过去的五年时间里,IPO股票价格市盈率可谓差距巨大。IPO股票价格市盈率高至超过100, 低至少于5。 

对于中国市场来讲,情况可以瞬息万变。IPO股票价格市盈率很有可能出现回升趋势。什么时候会发生?我们无法给您一个准确的答案。但是我们可以确定的是,一个优秀的私募股权投资者想要投资于有明确目标和有能力实现目标的中国优秀企业。

 换言之,企业有计划和具体步骤去提升利润和利润率。那么,选择正确的中国企业进行投资,选择适当的额度进行投资和帮助企业提升整体价值,是私募股权投资公司和风险投资公司在未来几年内成功的关键所在。

 私募股权投资公司和风险投资公司提升企业价值的方式有很多。可以通过向企业提供市场营销,业务发展,金融工程,运营效率,企业治理,审计,战略兼并和收购等方面专业人才,来帮助企业迅速提高企业价值。

无论通过上述哪种方式,企业的收益都有可能被大大提高。关键点是,帮助企业保持强劲的利润增长态势。这样,在股市复苏的时候,IPO的时机再一次到来时,我们的客户企业会从中脱颖而出,赢得最高收益。 

2009年,一个有着投资重点和帮助企业成长的私募股权投资公司会脱颖而出。

 

 


American and Chinese entrepreneurs: they are very different, but the best are equally good at making their investors rich

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Held each year in Los Angeles, the technology conference organized by the investment bank Montgomery & Co. is one of the best of its kind, anywhere. It brings together about 1,000 people from the top American venture capital and private equity firms along with senior management at some of the most accomplished privately-owned technology companies in the US. It provides a very focused snapshot of some of the strongest new tech business models and where venture capital and private equity firms are looking to invest this year.  

I was at the conference from start to finish, in meetings and panels. It was a great gathering in every respect, with a level of optimism that runs counter to much of the economic gloom that dominates the headlines. One reason: good technology can thrive in bad times. Corporate budgets are getting squeezed and each purchase is more tightly scrutinized. This means that many new tech solutions, offering good or better performance at lower price, have a great opportunity to gain market share against more lumbering competitors. 

I saw some interesting companies with interesting business models, in particular several that were focused on SaaS (“Software-as-a-Service”) solutions that can dramatically lower for businesses large and small the cost (both hardware and software) of implementing enterprise software. SaaS makes so much sense because companies can switch to a powerful software solution, but without the need to buy and install any of the software or hardware to run it. It’s all done using an internet browser as the main interface. The software is hosted and managed on a central server by the company that developed it. Users pay a monthly or annual fee to use the software. 

SaaS is an area where I have a special interest. I’m lucky enough to be CEO of Awareness Technologies (www.awarenesstechnologies.com), which develops and sells SaaS-based corporate security software. Awareness also has as its founders two of the best entrepreneurs I’ve ever met, Ron and Mike. They are superstars.

Great entrepreneurs are rare, even in a conference of hot technology companies. Of the 100 tech companies at the Montgomery conference, very few – by my very unscientific study — seemed to have a great entrepreneur at the controls. Most are venture-backed, and so tend to have very experienced professional managers at the top. Often, the founding entrepreneurs have been pushed out, or given different roles, after the venture capital money arrives. One obvious reason for this: the venture capital and private equity partners are usually from similar backgrounds as the professional managerial class, with gold-plated resumes and MBA degrees from the best universities in the US.  Institutional investors often look for a safe pair of hands, and not a visionary, to run a company once their money is committed. This is sometimes the right choice.

That’s the usual pattern in the US. I was struck, not surprisingly, by the differences in China. Great entrepreneurs are no less rare, but it’s almost impossible for me to imagine a situation where the founder of a Chinese company is pushed aside by the venture capital or private equity firm after its put its money in. That would, in most cases, be sheer madness. First, there is no large “professional managerial class” in China at this point, with experienced managers who have run successful businesses previously, and then either sold them or led them to IPO.

Second, and perhaps even more important, good Chinese companies, in my experience and to an extent rarely seen in the US, are one-man shows. There is usually as boss and owner one superbly talented, charismatic, driven and shrewd individual, who saw a market opportunity and seized it. Against unimaginable odds – including the severe ack of capital, continually changing regulations, predatory officials, the primitive market economy of ten years ago in China, and the fiercest competitors – these successful Chinese business owners managed to build large and thriving companies. Single-handedly. There is usually no “management team” to speak of — just one man of outsized abilities and an equally outsized will to succeed.

Another difference with the US: the best entrepreneurs in China, and so the best investment opportunities for venture capital and private equity firms,  aren’t likely in the technology business. They most often are in what are considered, in the US, old-line, low-growth businesses like manufacturing, retailing, branded consumer goods. In the US, companies in these sectors find it nearly impossible to raise money from venture capital and private equity companies. In China, it’s where most of the VC and PE investment goes.

It’s what makes China such an interesting place to be for venture capital and private equity, and why I feel so lucky to have a business there in that field. China has both the most sophisticated global investors and the most well-run, entrepreneurial smokestack industries.

Of the 100 companies at the Montgomery conference, I can’t think of a single one that runs a factory and manufactures a tangible product. The guys who run these companies are almost certainly all college graduates, often with advanced degrees, looking for money to complete or market a website, a software application, an internet advertising platform. In China, conversely, a conference filled with some of the better, more promising private companies would have 100 men, most with only a high-school education, looking for money to expand their factories, fulfill more customer orders and so double their revenues and profits in the next year or  two.

As someone who has spent a big part of his life managing technology and venture capital businesses, I see great opportunities to make money investing in both China and the US. The big difference is that in the US, the biggest risks for venture capital and early stage private equity investors tend to be technological, that the company you’ve invested in may not succeed because its product or service doesn’t work as planned, or isn’t as good as a competitor’s. In China, technology risk is usually minimal. The big risk for venture and private equity firms is that the rules may change, and the company you’ve invested will not be able to freely operate in the domestic market in China.

How do I manage risk personally? I try to eliminate it, by working with the best entrepreneurs. I’m confident Awareness Technologies will widen its technological lead, become the dominant SaaS-based security software company and make its investors a ton of money. Equally, I’m confident the Chinese companies we work with at China First Capital will become dominant in their industries in China and make their investors a ton of money. Along the way, the men running these Chinese businesses will continue to do what they’ve always done: find ingenious ways to stay one step ahead of competitors and any changes in the country as a whole.

AltAssets writes on China First Capital’s Report on Private Equity in China 2009

AltAssets is among the world’s leading sources for news and analysis on the global private equity industry. They just published a summary of my firms report, 2009 Private Equity and Strategic M&A Transactions in China — A Preview“. 

AltAssets is based in London, and provides news and research to more than 1,000 institutional investors and 2,000 private equity and venture capital firms worldwide.

Here is what they wrote about the China First Capital report:

 

altassets_logo

CHINA THE MOST ROBUST EMERGING MARKET FOR PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL SAYS REPORT”


China continues to be the world’s most robust emerging market for private equity and venture capital finance, even in a difficult global economic environment, according to the Private Equity and Strategic M&A Transactions in China 2009 report just released by China First Capital, a boutique investment bank with offices in China, Hong Kong and the USA.

Peter Fuhrman, China First Capital’s chairman and the report’s author, said, “While the overall investment environment remains challenging and the effects of 2008’s turbulence are still being felt, 2009 will be a year of unique opportunity for private equity, venture capital and M&As in China.” 

China’s economy continues to grow, powered largely by successful small and medium private businesses, many of which are among the fastest-growing companies in the world. Private equity and venture capital investment in China will likely reach record levels in 2009, the report projects, with over $1bn in new investment into high-growth Chinese SMEs with strong focus on China’s booming domestic market. 

“In 2009, China should rightly be among the most attractive and active private equity investment markets in the world,” the China First Capital report predicts. “Many of the international private equity firms we work with are expecting to invest more in Chinese SMEs in 2009 than in 2008. Chinese companies raising capital this year will enjoy significant financial advantages over competitors, improving market share and profitability.” 

The report identifies five central trends that will drive the growth in private equity and venture capital investment in China’s SMEs in 2009. They are: the drive for industrial consolidation; profit growth helping to reignite the IPO markets for Chinese companies in China, Hong Kong and the USA; increased importance of convertible debt and other hybrid financings; opportunities for strategic M&As; well-financed businesses with strong balance sheets will enjoy sustainable competitive advantage in China’s domestic market. 

“The pathways to success in China are fewer and narrower than in recent years. But, for the entrepreneurs and private equity investors that can navigate their way in 2009, this will be a year of abundant opportunity,” Fuhrman added. 

Copyright © 2009 AltAssets

Requiem For A Tough Year – 2008 Was the Most Challenging Time in a Generation in China

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As the Chinese National Congress meets this week in Beijing to plot the course of the Chinese economy in 2009 and beyond, it’s worth reflecting what an exceptional, juddering year 2008 was. Sure, the Olympics stole most of the headlines, and provided the lasting images of Chinese progress and triumph. But, those images also dulled, in many respects, our perceptions of the brunt force of the economic blows China sustained during 2008. Make no mistake, 2008 was a year of challenge, disruption and dislocation not seen in China for a generation or more. 

The year started with the worst winder storms in decades. This was followed, just months later, by the cataclysmic Wenchuan Earthquake in Sichuan. Beyond the colossal loss of life and destruction, the earthquake had a much broader, unprecedented social impact across China. There was an enormous outpouring of national compassion and grief. While wholly positive as an expression of China’s rightful growing self-confidence, this vast prolonged period of national mourning also had a very direct and negative impact on economic activity. For weeks if not months, as I saw firsthand, there was a tangible unwillingness to spend as freely, to enjoy life as unabashedly as in the years previously. It was as if much of China received some intimation of their own mortality in the wake of the Sichuan Earthquake. 

Next came an accelerated fall in property values across much of China. Alongside this, the stock market fell sharply. These two, the property and stock markets, are the main stores of wealth for many middle class Chinese. People felt poorer because they were poorer. The fall of both property and share prices wiped away billions of dollars in national household wealth. People in their hundreds of millions were suddenly poorer, as household net worth plummeted, and Chinese pulled back even more strongly from their spending. Then, in late summer, came the financial tsunami in the USA, with the credit crisis, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and the intensifying recession. 

Any basic college economics textbook – to say nothing of common sense — could foretell the next step: a fall in overall confidence levels among Chinese consumers. This further muffled already depressed levels of personal spending. 

We’re now well into the first quarter of 2009, and my own sense, after spending these last three weeks in China, is that the cumulative impact of all of 2008’s bad news is still being felt, acutely. However, my sense is that the worst may indeed be over, and that 2009 will be a year of rebuilding and reasserted economic confidence in China. 

Of course, when talking about general economic trends in the world’s third largest economy, a lot of the clarifying detail gets lost. But, we have a real sense, in our day-to-day work, of just what an extraordinarily difficult year 2008 was for even the best Chinese businesses. Our firm, China First Capital,  has focused on serving China’s middle market private Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), assisting them with capital-raising strategic M&A and other financial transactions.

Unlike traditional investment banks reliant mainly on short-term transactions, China First Capital’s role as financial and strategic advisor to Chinese SMEs often begins at early stages of corporate development and continues through the capital raising process from private equity to a successful IPO and beyond to global leadership. 

Even our strongest clients had a tough time in 2008. In one example, a business that is one of China’s leading consumer fashion brand, maintained outstanding growth last year in overall revenue, with domestic sales rising by 30%.  That’s mainly testament to the company’s no less outstanding management and brand-positioning. But, the bottom line was less stellar. Profit margins were squeezed, and the company earned half as much in 2008 as it expected to as late as July 2008. That represents a shortfall against plan of almost $6mn. That equates, of course, to having less money to invest in building on that growth rate in 2009.  

They remain a great company, and there’s little doubt 2009 will be a better year. But, when we met with them recently, the company’s financial management are still reeling from the brutal effects of 2008. If nothing else, it drives home as little else can the importance of fortifying the company’s balance sheet, which has been overly-reliant on retained earnings and short-term bank loans to finance growth. This client, like the Chinese economy, has weathered the once-in-a-generation turmoil of 2008. Better days lie ahead — my bet is sooner, rather than later.  

Private Equity and Strategic M&A Transactions in China 2009: A New Dawn

China First Capital, a boutique investment bank, releases comprehensive analysis of five key trends for 2009 in Private Equity, Venture Capital and M&A markets in China.jpg

My firm, China First Capital, just completed our annual report on Private Equity, Venture Capital and Strategic Mergers and Acquisitions in China. I had the biggest hand in writing it, so the opinions expressed are my own. My view, overall, is one of realistic optimism. China will continue to be the world’s most robust emerging market for private equity and venture capital finance, even in a very difficult global economic environment. A big reason for this is the continuing strong performance of many private SME companies in China, especially those focused on the domestic market, rather than exports. 

China First Capital has a special affinity for these strong private SMEs. They are the only companies we choose to work with. There a few reasons for this. A big one is my personal conviction that the most important predictor of a success in private equity investing is putting money into a company with a truly outstanding boss. Ideally, the boss will also be the entrepreneur who founded the company. 

You can do all the spreadsheet modeling and projections you want, but nothing else matters quite as much as the quality and drive of the leadership at the top. In many of the good Chinese SMEs, the boss is a first-class business strategist and opportunity-seeker. Give him a dollar and he’ll bring you back five. In many of China’s larger state-owned, or partially state-owned companies in China, the boss is often more a political animal, appointed to the job as much for skills as a bureaucratic infighter as for talents at managing a business. Give him a dollar and he’ll come back in a while and ask you to lend him another three. 

SMEs, no surprise, usually run circles around their state-owned competitors in China. That’s a big reason we choose to work exclusively for SMEs. Another reason: we prefer long-term partnerships with our clients rather than one-off deal-making of larger investment banks. We act as a financial and strategic advisor to Chinese SMEs in a long-term process that often begins at early stages of corporate development and continues through the capital raising process from private equity to a successful IPO and beyond to global leadership. 

Thanks to these Chinese SMEs,  China should be among the most attractive – and active – private equity investment markets in the world in 2009. Many of the international private equity firms we work with are expecting to invest more in Chinese SMEs in 2009 than in 2008. Indeed, private equity and venture capital investment in China will likely reach record levels in 2009, the report projects, with over $1 billion in new investment into high-growth Chinese SMEs with strong focus on China’s booming domestic market.

Chinese companies raising capital this year will enjoy significant financial advantages over competitors, improving market share and profitability.

The report, titled “Private Equity and Strategic M&A Transactions in China 2009”, identifies five central trends that will drive the growth in private equity and venture capital investment in China’s SMEs in 2009. They are:

  1. the drive for industrial consolidation;
  2. profit growth helping to reignite the IPO markets for Chinese companies in China, Hong Kong and the USA;
  3. increased importance of Convertible Debt and other hybrid financings;
  4. opportunities for strategic mergers and acquisitions;
  5. well-financed businesses with strong balance sheets will enjoy sustainable competitive advantage in China’s domestic market.

Here’s the report’s first section. I’ll add more of it in later posts.

 

 Overview  chinese-balance

       

Turbulence creates opportunity

2008 was a year of extremes in China. Extremes of joy and pride, during the Beijing Olympics. Extremes of sadness and shock following the Sichuan earthquake. Even the climate reached extremes, during China’s crippling winter storms early in 2008. 

Financially, 2008 was also a year of extremes. The stock markets in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenzhen rose strongly in the first months of the year, and IPOs were plentiful. By mid-year, the markets began plunging, and IPOs dried up. By year-end, Shenzhen, Shanghai and Hong Kong were all down 60% for the year. 

China’s private equity and venture capital investments followed a similar turbulent course, beginning strongly, with over $10 billion invested in Chinese companies in the first half of the years, and then the pace of new investments slowed to a crawl.   

Governments in China, the USA and around the world intervened in an unprecedented fashion to stabilize the economy and the credit markets. As we enter 2009, there is no longer any doubt that the world economy is in recession. 

The question now is when will the recovery begin and when will be a good time to begin investing again? I want to offer a personal perspective to our valued relationships, both clients and the private equity firms we work with. As Chairman of China First Capital,  Ltd, with over 20 years of experience in the capital markets, private equity and business analytics, I’ve survived my share of business cycles. One example, I was CEO of a California venture capital company during the Dot-Bust years, the last time private equity investing came to a similar standstill. Within two years, deal activity and valuations resumed their upward momentum. 

My view: the overall investment environment in China remains challenging and the effects of 2008’s turbulence are still being felt. But, 2009 will be a year of unique opportunity for private equity, venture capital and mergers and acquisitions in China. Tough times can be the best time to make money. 

Consolidation and “flight to quality”

 

 

The Chinese economy is under significant strain as 2009 begins, with growth decelerating, factories closing by the thousands and unemployment rising. Many areas of China’s domestic economy are “over-saturated”, with too many companies competing with small market shares. China is ripe for consolidation. 

In the freely competitive markets, the weakest companies will perish. The stronger competitors will be able to add market share and enjoy the virtuous cycle of increasing volumes lowering unit costs, thus boosting profits that can be re-invested to lower still further costs of production.

Chinese consumers will respond as well, and reward with more of their money the better managed companies with the most efficient manufacturing and distribution. Out of this, stronger dominant brands will emerge, and this too will push for greater consolidation.

This process is just beginning in China. China’s domestic market is huge, second only to the US. In many vertical markets (including financial services, consumer goods, distribution and logistics, retailing, fashion), each point of additional market share in China can equate to tens of millions of dollars in additional revenue.

Chinese companies are still, most often, small-in-scale relative to the size of the industries they serve, particularly in areas where private companies, rather than those with partial or complete state-ownership, predominate Strong regional companies will acquire competitors elsewhere in China to become national powerhouses.   

For investors, the opportunities will be unparalleled to back the Chinese companies that will thrive during this process of consolidation.  The winners will be able to increase revenues and profits strongly and sustainably, even in a weak economy.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Stairway to Hell? IPO Activity in China Falls Off a Cliff

 

Not quite “a staircase to hell”, but the graphic below shows the steep fall in IPO activity in China in 2008. It looks pretty scary, doesn’t it? Chinese IPO activity in 2008 was at its lowest level since 2004. IPO activity basically came to a halt towards the end of last year. 

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No one looking at the table will see much room for optimism. But, it’s worth remembering that though down by almost 80% from the year earlier, IPOs of Chinese companies in 2008 still did manage to raise $20 billion of new capital. The key thing now is that this money is used well and wisely, to build profits and market share at these now-publicly-traded Chinese companies. By doing so, these companies will provide an impetus for companies and investors to get back into the IPO market. 

In other words, the IPO market in China is most attractive vibrant not when a company sees a big price jump in its first days of trading. This does little for company, and benefits mainly those who claimed an allocation of shares ahead of the IPO. The key driver for the IPO market should be that the capital raised in an IPO is used wisely, to put companies on a higher growth path. 

Higher profits will boost company valuation, and also allow newly-listed companies to more easily raise additional equity capital in the future. As I sometimes remind the Chinese laoban we work with, “an IPO should not be just a goal in itself, but also the cheapest way to raise additional capital to build your business even faster.” 

Take the money from a public listing to make more money: that’s the quickest way in which Chinese companies can do their part for reviving the IPO market and start building again the “staircase to heaven”, with annual gains every year in the amount of money raised through IPOs. 

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China M&A: 2008 Is A Record Year, And The Strong Growth Will Continue

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Even as IPO activity all but came to a standstill in 2008, China’s M&A market reached an all-time high in 2008, with almost USD$160 billion in deals completed, according to Thomson Reuters. This makes China the biggest M&A market in Asia, for the first time ever. 

This is an important development, and I expect China’s role as Asia’s largest M&A market will continue into the future, despite the current economic slowdown. The reasons: M&A deals in China will continue to make business and financial sense. China’s M&A activity in 2008 was almost equally split between purely domestic deals – where one Chinese company buys or merges with another – and the cross-border acquisitions where Chinese and foreign firms join together – either with the Chinese firm buying into the overseas business, or the foreign firm taking a stake in a Chinese one.  

I see huge scope for growth in both areas. China’s economy, though growing more slowly now than in recent years, is still expanding. Despite its vase size (China is now the world’s third-largest economy, trailing only Japan and the US) Chinese companies are still, most often, small-in-scale relative to the size of the industries they serve, particularly in areas where private companies, rather than those with partial or complete state-ownership, predominate. China’s private sector is filled with minnows, not whales. 

The result: there is ample room for consolidation in virtually every industry. Smaller firms will continue to merge, to gain both market share and scale economies. Strong regional companies will acquire competitors elsewhere in China to become national powerhouses. 

The M&A market, more than IPO activity, tends to holds up well even during sour economic times, or when stock markets fall. As share prices drop, the lower valuations make it cheaper for acquirers to act. We had evidence of this recently in the US, where one of the biggest M&A deals of all-time was recently announced: Pfizer’s planned acquisition of Wyeth Labs. 

In China, valuations for both quoted and private companies are lower than they were a year ago. That lowers the cost of acquiring a competitor. The cheapest way to build market share, at this point in China, will often be to buy it. 

All M&A transactions have risk. Very often, the planned-for gains in efficiency never materialize from combining two similar businesses. In China, the complexities go above and beyond this. There is due diligence risk – the difficulty of getting accurate financial information about an acquisition target – and management risk as well.  Good Chinese companies are  usually owned and run by a single strong Chairman, with scarce management talent around him. In a merger, the boss of the acquired company will often step aside, leaving a big hole in that company’s management, and so making it harder for the acquiring company to integrate its new acquisition. 

How to do M&A right in China? Good deal-structure and good advice are crucial. Structure can anticipate and resolve some of the larger post-acquisition headaches. Advice is important to make sure that the price and strategic fit are right. Just as China’s SMB’s need specialized merchant banks to serve their needs in raising capital, these SMBs, as they grow, will also need competent M&A advisors to identify target companies, manage the DD, do the valuation work, help negotiate the price, and assist with post-acquisition integration. 

Last year was a strong one for M&A in China. But, the future should be even brighter, once current economic uncertainty begins to abate.  Looking ahead, I see a real possibility that China’s M&A market will overtake America’s as the world’s largest. I’m planning for my company to play a part in this. 

A New Year of Challenges and Opportunities in China’ Private Equity Industry

chin-amulet-wanli-taichang

Looking purely at the economic news from China of late, this has not been the happiest of Chinese New Years. The Chinese government is estimating that 16% of the huge migrant labor force of 200 million will have no job to return to after the New Year.  Factories are continuing to close, or cut employment, across the country. Guangdong province, where China First Capital has its base in China, is particularly hard hit, because it’s still the primary production base for much of China’s better private factories. While factories are being moved out of Guangdong to less expensive, inland locations like Jiangxi, overall industrial employment in factories in Guangdong is still huge, and hugely reliant on migrant labor. There’s no solid date, but ten million or more workers may have lost their jobs in Guangdong over the last six months. 

The picture is no less bleak in terms of projections for corporate profits in China in 2009. Larger companies are reporting profit falls of over 50% in 2008, and forecasting even worse results this year. This matters crucially in China. Over 40% of total economic output is generated by business investment. This, in turn,  is intimately tied to corporate profits, since most of that business investment is financed out of retained profits. According to a recent report in the Wall Street Journal, “official statistics show that 63% of investment in China last year was financed by what are called “internally generated” funds, which include retained profits. That’s up from just below 50% a decade ago.” 

In other words, as corporate profits decline, they take Chinese GDP growth with them. This falling economic output, in turn, influences consumer sentiment, and so takes personal spending down with it. 

Good economic news is a scarce commodity this Chinese New Year. But, I see one bright glimmer of hope here. Chinese companies have been excessively reliant on retained earnings and expensive bank debt to finance their growth, rather than equity capital. The difficult economic environment, in China and indeed worldwide, provides a good opportunity for better Chinese companies to reorient their method of financing capital investment and growth. It’s the right time to take on equity capital, and use it as a platform to continue to invest and grow, even if corporate profits are in cyclical decline. 

The Chinese companies that can raise equity finance will enjoy a significant financial advantage over competitors, and so be able to gain market share. Adding equity finance lets a company both lower its overall cost of capital, and also increase the amount of capital it can put to work in its business. Both of these factors equate to a very real competitive advantage. 

Equity investors, principally PE firms, will need to change their orientation as well. The opportunities to do shorter-term “pre-IPO” financing are far fewer than they were, because stock market valuations are way down and IPO activity has slowed to a crawl. So, the simple arbitrage of a PE firm buying into a Chinese company at a valuation, say, of 10x and selling out 18 months later in an IPO at 20x are gone. 

Instead, PE investors in China need to think more like value investors, and less like arbitrageurs. This means looking for opportunities to deploy capital into good businesses offering high rates of return on that invested capital. Equity investment is then used to expand output, lower unit costs, gain market share, and so expand both profits and profit margins. Build profits and valuation will take care of itself. If a Chinese company can put equity capital to work well, and accelerate profits in 2009 and beyond, that business will be worth a lot more money when the IPO market revives than if it simply cut back on investing to ride out the bad times. 

This year is going to be difficult, challenging, but also potentially highly rewarding for all of us participating in the financing of private companies in China. It’s a year when good companies should be able to get even better. And smart-money PE firms will make far more, over the medium-term, than fast-money valuation arbitrageurs ever did. 

 

IPO Market in China — Down in 2008, But Not By As Much as in the USA

song-vase

 

Looking for confirmation of how much more vibrant China’s IPO market — and therefore private equity market — is than the US? Well, the numbers are in. China’s IPO market has stumbled. America’s is in a coma.  

As reported in the Shanghai Daily, the number of IPOs in 2008 on China’s domestic stock exchanges fell, both in number and amount of capital raised. The totals were 76 IPOs, compared to 118 in 2007. The total capital raised was US$15 billion (RMB 103.4 billion) on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, down 77% from a year earlier.

While hardly a banner year for IPOs in China, the situation in the IPO market in the US was nothing short of cataclysmic. IPO activity was basically at a standstill, touching lows not seen for a generation. The last two quarters of the year, there wasn’t a single IPO by a venture capital or private equity-backed business. The IPO window in China may have closed somewhat. In the US, it seems welded shut.

What does this mean? Well, for one thing, it’s not a predictor of future activity. The US markets are highly cyclical. IPO activity ceased, in large part, because of more general weakness in the stock market, which was down over 33% in 2008. As the stock market begins to recover, so will IPO activity. Meantime, however, many venture capital and private equity firms in the US are going to suffer. Badly. 

In China, stock markets fell more steeply than in the US, but that didn’t entirely undermine the public appetite for new issues. There are a lot of cultural factors at work here. But, one fact that’s often overlooked is that most shares in China are owned by individuals. In the US, over two-thirds (by valuation) are owned by institutions. Individuals tend to have a higher appetite for risk than institutions, whose managers are constrained by fiduciary responsibilities and a competitive need to outperform their peers.

So, when it comes to the IPO market, China enjoys a structural advantage over the US, at this point in history. Equally important, China’s continued high economic growth of over 8% underpins corporate profit growth that is among the fastest in the world. 

Each $1 of profit in China can still be sold for $15 or more at IPO. That’s why China looks even more attractive, comparatively, than it did before for many of the world’s private equity firms. 

In the global competition for capital, China now ranks as a genuine superpower. 

Distressing Times — China’s Weak PE Firms Look to Sell Out

Ming Dynasty Ivory Luohan

 

Look up. Those are vultures circling over China’s Private Equity market. The vultures, in this case, are distress investors, including AIG and GE Capital. They have quietly begun shopping for the investment portfolios of hard-up private equity and venture capital firms who spent the last three to five years investing in China. The price they are offering: as little as five to ten cents on the dollar. In other words, a PE fund that invested $100mn in Chinese private companies could liquidate those investments for as little as $10mn in cash.

Who would be crazy enough to sell at that price?

Good question. It’s hard to see why any PE or VC fund would want out at that sort of price. After all, their investors (aka LPs) are locked in for the long haul, about 7-10 years on average. This is the signal difference PE and VC firms enjoy compared to hedge funds, whose investors usually can redeem either quarterly or annually. A PE or VC fund has better balance of assets and liabilities: its illiquid investments are matched by liabilities to its investors that are similarly long-term. 

This means a PE or VC firm can ride out any market turbulence, even one as severe as what we’re experiencing now. China’s stock markets are off 60% over the last 12 months, and IPO activity (the usual exit route for PE and VC investments in China) has all but dried up.   

And yet, you can be sure there are PE and VC firms that will sell out in coming months to distress investors. Why? It’s not because these funds will be legally or contractually or even morally obliged to sell. It’s more a matter of confidence – or lack thereof. While LPs can’t withdraw their money, they can make life very tough for PE or VC partners whose investments are in deep trouble. 

Another reason, PE or VC partners don’t much like the prospect of nursing investments for many years, during a difficult period, with no strong likelihood of a successful exit. VC and PE partners like to say they’re long-term investors. But, the reality is, they like to get in and out within two to three years, collect their share of profits, use this success as a selling point to raise more money from which they can collect even higher management fees. And so the wheel spins. At least in good times. 

Well, the good times are over. 

I’ve run a VC firm through the last down-cycle following the crash of the internet bubble in 2000. It takes a different kind of mindset than that of many PE and VC investors, especially ones who had a relatively easy time during the boom years, when some very mediocre companies can achieve successful exits. 

China’s PE market today is quite reminiscent of Silicon Valley venture capital after the 2000 crash. A lot of Silicon Valley VC firms (generally those with the weakest ability to make winning investments) sold out to distress investors back then. A similar pattern is emerging in China – the weakest will perish.   

The good firms know how to keep the vultures at bay. They are the ones who know how to manage in lean times, and how to work harder, faster and smarter with their portfolio companies to improve operations and cash flow. 

 

Coming Soon — A Stock Market for High-Tech Companies in Shenzhen

Zhou Dynasty Horse Fittings

Despite delays and continuing uncertainty, 2009 should see the opening of China’s first stock market for smaller, high-growth technology companies. Modeled on the NASDAQ in the US and AIM in London, this new market will be headquartered in Shenzhen, as part of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the smaller of the two stock markets in China.

Overall, this is a positive development for China’s financial industry, and the private equity and venture capital communities. Since China’s Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao announced in March 2008 the planned establishment of this new stock market, after almost a decade of internal discussion, the date for the launch has steadily slid back, a casualty of the 60% fall in China’s main stock markets this year.  

The final details have not been announced, but what seems clear at this point is that this new market will have significantly lower qualifying thresholds for companies seeking a stock market listing, compared to the main boards in Shenzhen and Shanghai. The numbers talked about are net assets above RMB 20 million (US$2.8mn) and revenues above RMB 10mn (US$1.5mn). There seems to be no requirement, as of now, for companies to be profitable at the time of listing. It’s possible, therefore, that companies listed on the new exchange will have market caps that barely exceed $10mn. 

 

Here’s my thinking. The largest quoted companies on the Shanghai market are trading at a price-earnings multiple of under 12. This is down, like the broader market, by almost 60% from recent highs. Put those kind of multiples on a small company with revenues under US$2mn and profits below $1mn, and you have the possibility of market caps in that very low range. True, high-tech companies tend to enjoy higher p/e multiples than more traditional large-caps. But, even so, this new stock market will be operating in some unchartered territory for China’s financial markets — companies with comparatively thin floats, low total market value, and so, most likely, higher price volatility. 

 

This could help explain why the Chinese government has repeatedly delayed plans to launch this stock market for high-growth companies. The regulators have probably seen this year all the volatility they care to see for a long time. 

 

Of course, the key factor won’t be earnings multiples or volatility, but the quality of the underlying high-tech businesses to be quoted on this exchange. Here’s where I see bigger problems. China, like its richer neighbors in Asia, as well as Western Europe, would very much like to rival the USA in nurturing successful high-tech companies in industries like software and chip technology. Across China, there are high-tech business parks where early-stage technology companies are concentrated. By one count, there are over 5,000 across the country. But, so far, there haven’t been many big break-out successes. 

 

The simple truth is that, as other countries have learned over the last decade, it’s hard to duplicate the particular success the US has in developing successful high-tech businesses. Having a stock market for high-tech companies is certainly not much of a factor. If so, Germany, which started its own high-tech company stock market, the NeuerMarkt ten years ago, would today be awash with leading technology firms. Instead, there are few, if any good tech companies in Germany and the Neuer Markt eventually was shut down. Britain’s AIM market has also failed to produce many successes in that country. 

 

In my mind, China does have a better shot than Germany, or Britain, or Japan. The main reason: Chinese are more entrepreneurial, and there’s more a culture of prudent risk-taking than elsewhere. If any country has a shot to achieve some of the same success the US has enjoyed building great technology companies, it’s got to be China. 

 

So, I hope this new stock market gets started early in 2009. It will provide more motivation – not that much is needed – to China’s budding technology leaders, and also provide another viable exit route for venture capital investors in China

 

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