China M&A

M&A in China – China First Capital’s New Research Report


CFC’s latest Chinese-language research report has just been published. The topic: M&A Strategy for Chinese Private Companies. Our conclusion: propelled by rapidly-growing domestic market and the continuing evolution of China’s capital markets, China will overtake the USA within the next decade as the world’s largest and most active market for mergers and acquisitions.

The report, titled “ 并购- 中国企业的成功助力”,can be downloaded by clicking here.

The report identifies five key drivers that fueling M&A activity among private sector companies in China.  They are: (1) a once-in-a-business-lifetime opportunity to seize meaningful market share in the domestic market; (2) the coming generational shift as China’s first generation of entrepreneurs moves toward retirement age; (3) a widening valuation gap between private and publicly-traded companies; (4) regulatory changes that will make it easier to pay for acquisitions using shares as well as cash; (5) increased access to IPO market in China for companies that have augmented organic growth through strategic M&A.

Several case studies from our work feature in the report, including a cross-border M&A deal we are doing, and one purely domestic trade sale. We take on a select number of M&A clients, and work as a sell-side advisor.

M&A in China has myriad challenges that do not often arise in other parts of the world. One we see repeatedly is that few Chinese acquirers have in-house M&A teams or investment banks on call to provide help with structure and valuation. Talking with anyone less than the company chairman is often a waste of time.

Another unique hurdle: “GIGO DD” or, more prosaically, “garbage in, garbage out due diligence.” Potential acquirers unfortunately will often start their industry research by doing a Chinese language web search using Baidu. There is a lot of dubious stuff out there that is given some credence, including phony websites and bizarre claims posted to people’s personal blogs or chatrooms.

In the cross-border deal we’re working on, several companies backed out of the process after finding Chinese companies claiming on their corporate website to make equipment identical to our client’s. This convinced these potential bidders that our client had technology and assets of little value. We actually took the time, unlike the potential acquirers, to call the phone numbers on these websites, posing as potential customers. None of the companies had any similar equipment for sale or in development. The material on their websites was bogus.

Market data from online sources is also usually specious. Few people, including lawyers, have working knowledge of how an M&A deal might impact a company’s plans for domestic IPO in China.

I’ve been inside some M&A deals in the US,  with their online data rooms, cloak-and-dagger codenames, and a precisely orchestrated bidding process. In China, the process is more unscripted.

Until recently, the only Chinese companies able and willing to do M&A were larger State-Owned Enterprises (SOE). The deals were done to buy oil and other natural resources on the stock market, or to acquire European brand names to put on Chinese-made products. Those deals include Sinopec’s purchase of shares in Canadian company Addax, CNOOC’s failed acquisition of UnoCal, TCL’s purchase of Thomson TVs and Alcatel phones, and Nanjing Automotive’s buying the MG brand.

These kind of deals will likely continue. But, in the future, M&A deals will become more numerous, more necessary for private entrepreneur-founded companies and have more complex strategic goals.

M&A is one of only two ways for founders and shareholders to achieve exit. The other is IPO. But, the number of private companies who can IPO in China will always be limited. At the moment, the number is about 250 per year. Compare that to the 70 million or so private companies in China.

The IPO process creates a special competitive dynamic in China. The first company in an industry to become publicly-traded usually has a huge advantage over competitors. They disrupt the previous equilibrium in an industry.

This means there are only two choices for many entrepreneurs. Both choices involve M&A. If you aren’t going to become a public company or a competitor has already gone public, you need to consider selling your company. If you want to become a public company,  you will need to become an expert at buying other companies.

The economic destiny of China, and many of its better private companies, is M&A.

 

Private Equity in China, CFC’s New Research Report

 

The private equity industry in China continues on its remarkable trajectory: faster, bigger, stronger, richer. CFC’s latest research report has just been published, titled “Private Equity in China 2011-2012: Positive Trends & Growing Challenges”. You can download a copy by clicking here.

The report looks at some of the larger forces shaping the industry, including the swift rise of Renminbi PE funds, the surging importance of M&A, and the emergence of a privileged group of PE firms with inordinate access to capital and IPO markets. The report includes some material already published here.

It’s the first English-language research report CFC has done in two years. For Chinese readers, some similar information has run in the two columns I write, for China’s leading business newspaper, the 21st Century Herald (click here “21世纪经济报道”) as well as Forbes China (click here“福布斯中文”) 

Despite all the success and the new money that is pouring in as a consequence, Chinese private equity retains its attractive fundamentals: great entrepreneurs, with large and well-established companies, short of expansion capital and a knowledgeable partner to help steer towards an IPO. Investing in Chinese private companies remains the best large-scale risk-adjusted investment opportunity in the world, bar none.

China PE Firms Do PF (Perfectly Foolhardy) “Delist-Relist” Deals

Hands down, it is the worst investment idea in the private equity industry today: to buy all shares of a Chinese company trading in the US stock market, take it private, and then try to re-list the company in China. Several such deals have already been hatched, including one by Bain Capital that’s now in the early stages, the planned buyout of NASDAQ-quoted Harbin Electric (with PE financing provided by Abax Capital) and a takeover completed by Chinese conglomerate Fosun.

From what I can gather, quite a few other PE firms are now actively looking at similar transactions. While the superficial appeal of such deals is clear, the risks are enormous, unmanageable and have the potential to mortally would any PE firm reckless enough to try.

A bad investment idea often starts from some simple math. In this case, it’s the fact there are several hundred Chinese companies quoted in the US on the OTCBB or AMEX with stunningly low valuations, often just three to four times their earnings.  That means an investor can buy all the traded shares at a low overall price, and then, in partnership with the controlling shareholders,  move the company to a more friendly stock market, where valuations of companies of a similar size trade at 20-30 times profits.

Sounds easy, doesn’t it? It’s anything but. Start with the fact that those low valuations in the US may not only be the result of unappreciative or uncomprehending American investors. Any Chinese company foolish enough to list on the OTCBB, or do any other sort of reverse merger, is probably suffering other less obvious afflictions. One certainty:  that the boss had little knowledge of capital markets and took few sensible precautions before pulling the trigger on the backdoor listing which, among its other curses, likely cost the Chinese company at least one million dollars to complete, including subsequent listing and compliance costs.

Why would any PE firm, investing as a fiduciary, want to go in business with a boss like this? An “undervalued asset” in the control of a guy misguided enough to go public on the OTCBB may not be in any way undervalued.

Next, the complexities of taking a company private in the US. There’s no fixed price. But, it’s not a simple matter of tendering for the shares at a price high enough to induce shareholders to sell. The legal burden, and so legal costs, are fearsome. Worse, lots can – and often will – go wrong, in ways that no PE firm can predict or control. The most obvious one here is that the PE firm, along with the Chinese company, get targeted by a class action lawsuit.

These are common enough in any kind of M&A deal in the US. When the deal involves a cash-rich PE firm and a Chinese company with questionable management abilities, it becomes a high likelihood event. Contingency law-firms will be salivating. They know the PE firm has the cash to pay a rich settlement, even if the Chinese company is a total dog. Legal fees to defend a class action lawsuit can run into tens of millions of dollars. Settling costs less, but targets you for other opportunistic lawsuits that keep the legal bills piling up.

The PE firm itself ends up spending more time in court in the US than investing in China. I doubt this is the preferred career path for the partners of these PE firms. Bain Capital may be able to scare off or fight off the tort lawyers. But, other PE firms, without Bain’s experience, capital and in-house lawyers in the US, will not be so fortunate. Instead, think lambs to slaughter.

Also waiting to explode, the possibility of an SEC investigation,or maybe jail time. Will the PE firm really be able to control the Chinese company’s boss from tipping off friends, who then begin insider trading? The whole process of “bringing private” requires the PE firm to conspire together, in secret, with the boss of the US-quoted Chinese company to tender for shares later at a premium to current price. That boss, almost certainly a Chinese citizen, can work out pretty quickly that even if he breaks SEC insider trading rules, by talking up the deal before it’s publicly disclosed, there’s no risk of him being extradited to the US. In other words, lucrative crime without punishment.

The PE firm’s partners, on the other hand, are not likely immune. Some will likely be US passport or Green Card holders. Or, as likely, they have raised money from US institutions. In either case, they will have a much harder time evading the long arm of US justice. Even if they do, the publicity will likely render them  “persona non grata” in the US, and so unable to raise additional funds there.

Such LP risk – that the PE firm will be so disgraced by the transaction with the US-quoted Chinese company that they’ll be unable in the future to raise funds in the US – is both large and uncontrollable. The potential returns for doing these “delist-relist” deals  aren’t anywhere close to commensurate with that risk. Leaving aside the likelihood of expensive lawsuits or SEC action, there is a fundamental flaw in these plans.

It is far from certain that these Chinese companies, once taken private, will be able to relist in China. Without this “exit”, the economics of the deal are, at best, weak. Yes, the Chinese company can promise the PE firm to buy back their shares if there is no successful IPO. But, that will hardly compensate them for the risks and likely costs.

Any proposed domestic IPO in China must gain the approval  of China’s CSRC. Even for strong companies, without the legacy of a failed US listing, have a low percentage chance of getting approval. No one knows the exact numbers, but it’s likely last year and this, over 2,000 companies applied for a domestic IPO in China. About 10%-15% of these will succeed. The slightest taint is usually enough to convince the CSRC to reject an application. The taint on these “taken private” Chinese companies will be more than slight. If there’s no certain China IPO, then the whole economic rationale of these “take private” deals is very suspect.  The Chinese company will be then be delisted in the US, and un-listable in China. This will give new meaning to the term “financial purgatory”, privatized Chinese companies without a prayer of ever having tradeable shares again.

Plus, even if they did manage to get CSRC approval, will Chinese retail investors really stampede to buy, at a huge markup, shares of a company that US investors disparaged? I doubt it. How about Hong Kong? It’s not likely their investors will be much more keen on this shopworn US merchandise. Plus, these days, most Chinese company looking for a Hong Kong IPO needs net profits of $50mn and up. These OTCBB and reverse merger victims will rarely, if ever, be that large, even after a few years of spending PE money to expand.

Against all these very real risks, the PE firms can point to what? That valuations are much lower for these OTCBB and reverse merger companies in the US than comparables in China. True. For good reason. The China-quoted comps don’t have bosses foolish or reckless enough to waste a million bucks to do a backdoor listing in the US, and then end up with shares that barely trade, even at a pathetic valuation. Who would you rather trust your money to?

China Goes Shopping: The Compelling Logic of Doing M&A Deals in the US

Selling a business in the US?  Chinese can pay top dollar.

We are entering a golden age of Chinese M&A deals in the US. There is certainly a sharp pick-up in activity going on – not so much of announced deals yet, though there have been several, but in more intensive discussions between potential Chinese acquirers and US companies. There is also a lot more shopping and tire-kicking by Chinese buyers. I certainly see it in our business. We’re engaged now in several M&A deals whose goal is sale of a US company to a Chinese buyer. I expect to see more.

The reasons for this upsurge are many – including the recent appreciation of the Renminbi against the dollar, the growing scale and managerial sophistication of Chinese companies (particularly private as opposed to state-owned ones), attractive prices for target US companies, the launch in 2009 by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange of the Chinextboard for fast-growing private companies.

The best reason for Chinese buyers to acquire US firms is one less-often mentioned – to profit from p/e arbitrage. The gap between stock market valuations in the US and China, on price-earnings basis, are wide. The average trailing p/e in the US now is 14. On China’s Chinext board, it’s 45. For fast-growth Chinese companies, the p/e multiples can exceed 70. This gives some Chinese acquirers leeway to pay a higher price for a US business.

In the best cases, a dollar of earnings may cost $10-$15 to acquire through purchase of a US business, but that dollar is immediately worth fifty dollars or more to the Chinese firm’s own valuation. As long as the gap remains so large, it makes enormous economic sense for Chinese acquirers to be out buying US businesses.

This is equally true for Chinese companies already quoted on the Chinese stock market as well as those with that ambition. Indeed, for reasons unique to China, the incentive is stronger for private companies to do this p/e arbitrage. In China, public companies generally are forbidden from doing secondary offerings, nor can they use their own shares to pay for an acquisition. When a Chinese public company consolidates a US acquisition’s profits, its overall market value will likely rise. But, it has no way to capitalize by selling additional shares and replenish the corporate treasury.

For a private company, the larger the profits at IPO, the higher the IPO proceeds. An extra $1 million in profits the year before an IPO can raise the market cap by $50mn – $70mn when the company goes public on Chinext. Private Chinese companies, unlike those already public in China,  can also use their shares to pay for acquisitions. The better private companies also often have a private equity investor involved. The PE firms can be an important source of cash to finance acquisitions, since it will juice their own returns. PE firms like making money from p/e arbitrage.

In M&A, the best pricing strategy is to swap some of my overvalued paper to buy all of someone else’s undervalued paper.  At the moment, some of the most overvalued paper belongs to Chinese companies on the path to IPO in China.

Most M&A deals end up benefitting the selling shareholders far more than the buyers. That’s because the buyers almost always fail to capture the hoped-for savings and efficiencies from combining two firms. Too often, such synergies turn out to be illusory.

For Chinese acquirers, p/e arbitrage greatly increases the likelihood of an M&A deal paying off – if not immediately, then when the combined company goes public.

If the target company in the US has reasonable rate of profit growth, the picture gets even rosier. The rules are, a private Chinese company will generally need to wait three years after an acquisition to go public in China. As long as the acquired business’s profits keep growing, the Chinese companies market value at IPO will as well. Chinese acquirers should do deals like that all day long.

But, as of now, they are not. One reason, of course, is that things can and often also go wrong in M&A deals. Any acquirer can easily stumble trying to manage a new business, and to maintain its rate of growth after acquisition. It’s tougher still when it’s cross-border and cross-cultural.

Another key reason: domestic M&A activity in China is still rather scant. There isn’t a lot of experience or expertise to tap, particularly for private companies. Knowing you want to buy and knowing how to do so are very different beasts. I’ve seen that in our work. Chinese companies immediately grasp the logic and pay-off from a US acquisition. They are far less sure how to proceed. They commonly will ask us, investment bankers to the seller, how to move ahead, how to work out a proper valuation.

The best deals, as well as the easiest, will be Chinese acquiring US companies with a large untapped market in China. Our clients belong in this camp, US companies that have differentiated technology and products with the potential to expand very rapidly across China.

In one case, our client already has revenues and high profit margins in China, but lacks the local management and know-how to fulfill the demand in China.  The senior management are all based in the US, and the company sends trained US workers over to China, putting them up in hotels for months at a time, rather than using Chinese locals. Simply by localizing the staff and taking over sales operation now outsourced to a Chinese “agent”, the US company could more than double net profits in China.

The US management estimates their potential market in China to be at least ten times larger than their current level of revenues, and annual profits could grow more. But, to achieve that, the current  owners have concluded their business needs Chinese ownership.

If all goes right, the returns on this deal for a Chinese acquirer could set records in M&A. Both p/e arbitrage and high organic profit growth will see to that. Our client could be worth over $2 billion in a domestic IPO in China in four years’ time, assuming moderate profit targets are hit and IPO valuations remain where they are now on China’s Chinext exchange.

Another client is US market leader in a valuable media services niche, with A-List customers, high growth and profits this year above $5mn. After testing the M&A waters in the US, the company is now convinced it will attract a higher price in China. The company currently has no operations now in China, but the market for their product is as large – if not larger – than in the US. Again, it needs a Chinese owner to unlock the market. We think this company will likely prove attractive to quoted Chinese technology companies, and fetch a higher price than it will from US buyers.

The same is true for many other US companies seeking an exit. US businesses will often command a higher price in China, because of the valuation differentials and high-growth potential of China’s domestic market.

China business has prospered over the last 20 years by selling things US consumers want to buy. In the future,  it will prosper also by buying businesses the US wants to sell.

 


 

“The Great Unwind” — Jim Zukin’s Masterly Analysis of Global Financial Crisis & Opportunities for Chinese Companies to Benefit Through M&A

Ming Dynasty

Readers of this blog will know I’m a big fan of Jim Zukin, a founding partner of the investment bank Houlihan, Lokey, Howard and Zukin. We met again for lunch last week, in Los Angeles. 

I’ve had the pleasure of meeting, and befriending, quite a few smart, and highly successful businessmen and entrepreneurs. It’s probably been the most rewarding part of my career. But, even among such pretty stellar company, Jim Zukin stands out. I’m truly awestruck – which is not a quality I often exhibit — by his intellect, his charisma, his business savvy, his warmth and humor, his love for his family, his clear and incisive thinking on the largest issues of our time. 

Jim is also much, much better at investment banking than I will ever be. I tend to be somewhat stubborn and used to being in charge. But, Jim’s judgment as an investment banker is so much more thoroughgoing than my own, that he is one of the very few people I’ve known who, metaphorically,  I would follow unquestionably into battle. Like a good junior officer, I would,  “Salute, shut up, and do what I was told.” 

Jim shares with me a deep affection for China, and a great delight in doing business there. He spotted big potential opportunities for his firm in China several years ago, and personally traveled there frequently to get Houlihan Lokey’s office started and on a solid footing, which is where it is today. Jim is one of those people who seems to know more about more things than should be possible, let alone for a guy who’s also occupied with “minor” tasks like staying very close to his five kids and grandchild, while helping to run the thriving global investment bank he founded. 

Among the things Jim understands well (better than anyone I’ve run across) the remarkable moment in financial history we’re now living through – the US is struggling to rebuild its banking sector and recover from a serious credit crisis and recession, while China is awash in liquidity. Most experts look at this and see just one dimension – that China’s government will continue to use its massive foreign exchange reserves to buy US government debt, thereby providing some additional stability to US interest rates and the dollar. 

Jim Zukin sees beyond this – indeed well beyond the current horizon –  to another important aspect of the financial symbiosis between the US and China. Chinese companies, as Jim sees it,  now have the scale, the ambition, the growth potential and the financial resources, to acquire assets in the US. This could have transformational effects for the Chinese companies able to acquire businesses in the US, and no less of an impact on parts of the ailing US industrial base. China could, and should, become a buyer of quality Middle Market companies in the US. There are good reasons why: because these US assets will help the Chinese firm accelerate its growth,  improve distribution and customer base in the US, upgrade technology. One other reason: US Middle Market companies are comparatively cheap, at the current valuation multiples (often around 5x)  and dollar-renminbi exchange rate. 

Jim sees this opportunity earlier and more clearly than most of us. He does so, in part,  because he holds more substantive knowledge and insight about the US, China and the financial tsunami that has changed the world over the last year. He condensed some of this knowledge and insight into a Powerpoint called “The Great Unwind and Its Impact”. 

I recommend it as essential reading, for anyone who wants to understand better the current financial crisis and some longer-term impacts on China and the US.  There’s a large amount to chew on in Jim’s report, not just the section on China. It shows a breadth of understanding that help explain why Jim was able to build a perennially successful investment banking firm, as well as perhaps the only one that’s come through the current financial crisis stronger than ever. 

You can view it here:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/15194564/The-Great-Unwind-and-Its-Impact-By-Jim-Zukin

 

 

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Private Equity Firms in China in the Firing Line – Ratcheting Up the Criticism of Performance Ratchets

Ming Dynasty Cloisonne

In an interesting discussion this week in Shenzhen with a very smart and capable lawyer (Ke Luo of Fangda Partners), I learned about a small, but growing backlash against the Top Tier private equity firms working China. Evidently there have been some articles in the Chinese press voicing criticisms of their approach and methods, and comparing them unfavorably with Chinese domestic investment companies. 

Upfront disclosure: we choose to work only with the 70 or so Top Tier private equity firms active in China, as we believe they are the best investors for companies with the greatest potential, adding more value, beyond just capital, than any other source of investment. 

A main point of contention: the ratchet and performance provisions of most of the top private equity investment deals in China (and everywhere else in the world). These are the provisions, incorporated into the final closing share purchase agreement, through which the PE firm gains greater ownership in a company they’ve invested in if the company fails to meet previously agreed revenue, profit or margin targets.   

It’s a penalty for underperformance. And a very effective and focusing one. It’s not uncommon for these ratchets provisions to specify that the PE firm can gain an additional 10-15% ownership, at no additional cost,  in a company that fails to meet the annual targets. 

In good economic times and in solidly-run companies, ratchet provisions are very rarely put into effect. So, they are a generally just a ghoulish contingent presence in every PE investment contract, the stick that compliments the carrot of a PE firm investing in your business. I know from personal experience that the concept can seem very off-putting – even frightening – to some Chinese bosses: that the PE firm will, for example, go from owning 25% of his company to 40% of his company if the owner has one year that falls below the projected levels of profit and revenue. 

We’re not in good economic times at the moment, so it’s a certainty that more ratchet provisions will be triggered this year. This is what is behind some of the complaining in the Chinese press about international PE firms. Chinese investment firms apparently don’t often include ratchet provisions. The implication of the articles is that a Chinese company is better off taking money from a Chinese investment company, and so free itself from the possibility of a sort of “takeover by stealth”, as the PE firm’s ownership ratchets upward with each year of under-target performance. 

On the surface, ratchet provisions are a very fat, very easy target. So, no surprise some in the Chinese press are attacking them. But, it’s a very incomplete, unfair – and even financially illiterate – criticism to say that because of performance ratchet provisions, a Chinese company is better off taking money from a Chinese investment company. 

Chinese investment firms may not use performance ratchets, but they have a variety of other serious weaknesses. Believe me, I’m no fan of ratchets of any kind, and work hard in negotiations with PE firms to eliminate their potential for causing harm to our clients’ businesses.  But, I still think, in almost all cases, a good Chinese private company is far better off taking money from a reputable PE firm than from a more loosely-run Chinese investment business. 

The reasons are many. But, the most deep-seated are based on an appreciation of what an outside investor can and should provide a strong Chinese SME company besides just capital. Money, famously, all spends the same. So, taking $10mn from a rich uncle or from a leading private equity firm is no different, in terms of what the money can buy – a new factory perhaps, or expanded marketing and sales, or an acquisition. 

The key difference is that the best PE firms are going to do a lot more than just write a check and then wait for the riches to flow three years later at IPO. They are going to get deeply involved assisting the company to improve all areas of its operations, implementing best practices in areas like financial accounting and corporate governance, as well as providing real expertise on hard core sales and operational issues. They also know, from past successful experience, how best to guide a private company towards a successful IPO, whether on China’s domestic stock market, or abroad.

A Chinese investment company, from what I can gather, does not have the experience, the management talent – or even the inclination – to be involved in such a detailed fashion with the companies it invests in. 

I believe, based on my own practical experience,  that the good PE firms often really do make a significant difference inside a company, enabling it to get further faster than it otherwise would. Of course, PE firms can be a pain to work with. This goes way beyond the potential for a ratchet provision to be triggered. The good PE firms act as fiduciaries for their Limited Partners, and so require a massive amount of due diligence before investing, and no less enormous information flows (generally on financial performance) after an investment is made. They want quarterly board meetings, and often hold veto rights on any spending above $500,000 or so. 

But, in return, the PE firm will go to the furthest limits of its collective abilities to make sure the Chinese company succeeds above and beyond even what the boss of that company could expect. A domestic Chinese investment company? Most likely, they have had little experience with leading good companies toward successful IPOs, little operational knowledge, little desire to commit so thoroughly to adding value inside a company. 

So, yes, performance ratchet provisions are nasty. However, they should never come into effect – if the company and the PE firm are doing everything in their power to keep the business growing. The PE firms, contrary to the way it may appear, do not  want performance ratchets triggered any more than the company’s owner does. It’s also going to reflect badly on the PE firm’s judgment and abilities, and so make it harder for them to continue to raise money for future investment.

In other words, every time a performance ratchet is triggered, it gets harder for that PE firm to continue to thrive. They would rather own a smaller share of a solid company that’s meeting its targets, than a bigger share of one that isn’t.

 

Chinese Language Report on Private Equity in China 2009: 中国的私募股权投资与战略并购

Following on from the publication of the China First Capital report, 2009 Private Equity and Strategic M&A Transactions in China — A Preview , the Chinese version is now completed. It’s more than just a change in language.

It incorporates a different but complimentary perspective to the English report, one enriched by the deep knowledge, insights and experience of my China First Capital colleague, Amy Bai. 谢谢白海鹰。

Here’s the first section. 

China First Capital Chinese language report on Private Equity, Venture Capital in China 2009

 

 

概  览chinese-balance

 

危机创造机遇

2008 年对于中国是不平凡的一年。2008年带给我们骄傲和欢乐,也带给我们挫折和悲伤。北京奥运会使我们感到前所未有的骄傲和自豪。刚刚战胜了冰冻灾害的我们又遭遇了汶川大地震。

从经济领域来看,2008年同样也是不平凡的一年。在年初,上海、深圳和香港的股市都出现了长势良好的喜人景象。IPO形势大好。然而,在2008年夏,股市开始暴跌 ,IPO也开始枯竭。到年底,上海、深圳和香港的股市均下跌了60%左右。 

中国的私募股权投资和风险投资出现了与股市涨跌相应的波动变化。在年初,投资活动非常活跃。上半年,私募股权投资和风险投资在中国的投资总额超过了100多亿美元。随着金融风暴的影响,私募股权投资和风险投资也放缓了在中国的投资步伐。到去年底的时候,基本上已经停止了所有投资活动。 

中国,美国和全球其他国家均以前所未有的方式采取了一系列干预措施,以期稳定经济。然而, 

当我们跨入2009年时,全球经济进入衰退期已成为不争的事实。 

大家所关心的问题是,经济复苏期何时来临?何时开始新一轮的投资比较合适?我公司愿与您们分享就上述问题的一些观点和想法。 

作为中国首创投资的董事长,凭借在资本市场,私募股权投资和商业领域20余年的经验,我经历过数次商业周期,并且成功地带领我的企业幸存了下来。例如,我曾经担任美国加州一家风险投资公司的首席执行官,目睹了网络泡沫的破灭, 当时的情形和现在类似,所有的私募股权投资活动几乎都停止了。 但是,仅仅两年以后,交易活动和企业估值又呈现回升趋势。 

所以,我们认为,就整体投资环境而言,2008年的金融风暴将会继续影响中国经济的发展,中国目前仍旧会经受各种考验。但是,对于私募股权投资、风险投资和兼并收购而言,2009年是个充满着无限机会的一年。机会与风险并存。只要你抓住了机会,成功就近在咫尺。 

2009年,企业所有人和私募股权投资公司可以期待商业主题中的下列几点。 

行业整合与“质的飞跃”

在2009年新年伊始,我们就感受到了中国经济所面临的严峻局面。经济增长速度减慢,成千的工厂倒闭和数以万计的人失业。中国许多经济领域已经出现了一种所谓“超饱和”状态,也就是很多企业在一个经济领域竞争,但是每个企业的市场份额都很小。这种情况下,中国企业进行合并的时机已经成熟。

在市场经济的自由竞争规律下,缺乏竞争力的企业会逐渐被淘汰。然而,具有竞争力的企业会不断赢取市场份额。并且,在良性循环下会不断发展壮大。产量不断提高,成本继续降低,从而,提高利润。企业将所赚取的盈余再度投到生产中以降低成本,进而形成一个良性循环。 

从消费者的角度来说,一个优秀的企业,由于其管理完善、生产效率高和销售策略适当,吸引着无数消费者。除此之外,强有力的主导品牌将会适时并购其他品牌。在这种状况下,企业间的合并已经成为不可避免的趋势。 

在中国,这种合并的势头刚刚开始。中国拥有仅次于美国的巨大的国内市场。在中国的许多纵向市场(包括金融服务,消费品,分销和物流,零售,时尚等),只要多争取一分的市场份额,销售收入就能增加上千万美元。 

通常,相对于企业所处行业,中国企业的规模都相对较小。在一些国营企业和半国营企业不占主导地位的区域,优秀民营企业抢先出击,兼并和收购其他区域内的竞争者,进而成为国内行业的领军企业。

对于投资者来说,这种帮助企业进行并购活动的机会将是空前的。企业在并购后的兴盛是投资者和企业共同期待的。即使在经济衰退期,并购案中 的优胜企业也会呈现销售收入和利润长期持续增长的现象。 

利润增长为IPO的

重现提供了平台

 

在过去的五年里,对于投资中国市场的私募股权投资者和风险投资者来说,IPO无疑是最可靠的退出途径。 

下面的图显示,IPO交易量在2007年达到了高峰。在2008年初,IPO交易量继续呈现高增长趋势。然而,到2008年的下半年,IPO交易量急转直下,直到2009 年年初。

 chart-1

 

 

众所周知, IPO市场与股票市场紧密相连。当股票市场整体表现不好时,企业发行新股票的欲望也会相应减弱。所以,只要中国股票市场和香港股票市场继续呈现薄弱趋势,IPO活动就不会呈现上升趋势。 

对于私募股权投资者和风险投资者来说,这意味着他们需要做出巨大的改变。 

为适应当前形势,私募股权投资公司和风险投资公司需要改变他们的投资方向。较之前而言,企业IPO前的短期投资机会已大大减少。换言之,私募股权投资公司或风险投资公司以18倍的估值投资于中国企业, 18个月后,再以20倍的价值发行上市的简单套利的机会已经一去不复返了。 

取而代之的是,在中国进行投资活动的私募股权投资公司应该从价值投资者的角度考虑他们在中国的投资,而不是从套利的角度去衡量他们在中国的投资。这说明了,私募股权投资公司在中国寻找目标企业时,应以企业的长远高回报为目标注入投资基金。 

企业的利润增长为中国市场的IPO重现提供了平台。具体而言,私募股权投资的重点应该集中在帮助企业提高运作效率和利润率上。 

这是一个值得强调的财务理念,尤其是在现今中国。企业估值归根结底是一个与公司盈利能力相关的函数,而不是一个投资者愿意为公司盈利能力而支付的价格函数。在市盈率倍数的公式中,“收益”部分是关键,而不是“价格”部分。在过去的五年时间里,IPO股票价格市盈率可谓差距巨大。IPO股票价格市盈率高至超过100, 低至少于5。 

对于中国市场来讲,情况可以瞬息万变。IPO股票价格市盈率很有可能出现回升趋势。什么时候会发生?我们无法给您一个准确的答案。但是我们可以确定的是,一个优秀的私募股权投资者想要投资于有明确目标和有能力实现目标的中国优秀企业。

 换言之,企业有计划和具体步骤去提升利润和利润率。那么,选择正确的中国企业进行投资,选择适当的额度进行投资和帮助企业提升整体价值,是私募股权投资公司和风险投资公司在未来几年内成功的关键所在。

 私募股权投资公司和风险投资公司提升企业价值的方式有很多。可以通过向企业提供市场营销,业务发展,金融工程,运营效率,企业治理,审计,战略兼并和收购等方面专业人才,来帮助企业迅速提高企业价值。

无论通过上述哪种方式,企业的收益都有可能被大大提高。关键点是,帮助企业保持强劲的利润增长态势。这样,在股市复苏的时候,IPO的时机再一次到来时,我们的客户企业会从中脱颖而出,赢得最高收益。 

2009年,一个有着投资重点和帮助企业成长的私募股权投资公司会脱颖而出。

 

 


AltAssets writes on China First Capital’s Report on Private Equity in China 2009

AltAssets is among the world’s leading sources for news and analysis on the global private equity industry. They just published a summary of my firms report, 2009 Private Equity and Strategic M&A Transactions in China — A Preview“. 

AltAssets is based in London, and provides news and research to more than 1,000 institutional investors and 2,000 private equity and venture capital firms worldwide.

Here is what they wrote about the China First Capital report:

 

altassets_logo

CHINA THE MOST ROBUST EMERGING MARKET FOR PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL SAYS REPORT”


China continues to be the world’s most robust emerging market for private equity and venture capital finance, even in a difficult global economic environment, according to the Private Equity and Strategic M&A Transactions in China 2009 report just released by China First Capital, a boutique investment bank with offices in China, Hong Kong and the USA.

Peter Fuhrman, China First Capital’s chairman and the report’s author, said, “While the overall investment environment remains challenging and the effects of 2008’s turbulence are still being felt, 2009 will be a year of unique opportunity for private equity, venture capital and M&As in China.” 

China’s economy continues to grow, powered largely by successful small and medium private businesses, many of which are among the fastest-growing companies in the world. Private equity and venture capital investment in China will likely reach record levels in 2009, the report projects, with over $1bn in new investment into high-growth Chinese SMEs with strong focus on China’s booming domestic market. 

“In 2009, China should rightly be among the most attractive and active private equity investment markets in the world,” the China First Capital report predicts. “Many of the international private equity firms we work with are expecting to invest more in Chinese SMEs in 2009 than in 2008. Chinese companies raising capital this year will enjoy significant financial advantages over competitors, improving market share and profitability.” 

The report identifies five central trends that will drive the growth in private equity and venture capital investment in China’s SMEs in 2009. They are: the drive for industrial consolidation; profit growth helping to reignite the IPO markets for Chinese companies in China, Hong Kong and the USA; increased importance of convertible debt and other hybrid financings; opportunities for strategic M&As; well-financed businesses with strong balance sheets will enjoy sustainable competitive advantage in China’s domestic market. 

“The pathways to success in China are fewer and narrower than in recent years. But, for the entrepreneurs and private equity investors that can navigate their way in 2009, this will be a year of abundant opportunity,” Fuhrman added. 

Copyright © 2009 AltAssets

Requiem For A Tough Year – 2008 Was the Most Challenging Time in a Generation in China

tang-bowls

As the Chinese National Congress meets this week in Beijing to plot the course of the Chinese economy in 2009 and beyond, it’s worth reflecting what an exceptional, juddering year 2008 was. Sure, the Olympics stole most of the headlines, and provided the lasting images of Chinese progress and triumph. But, those images also dulled, in many respects, our perceptions of the brunt force of the economic blows China sustained during 2008. Make no mistake, 2008 was a year of challenge, disruption and dislocation not seen in China for a generation or more. 

The year started with the worst winder storms in decades. This was followed, just months later, by the cataclysmic Wenchuan Earthquake in Sichuan. Beyond the colossal loss of life and destruction, the earthquake had a much broader, unprecedented social impact across China. There was an enormous outpouring of national compassion and grief. While wholly positive as an expression of China’s rightful growing self-confidence, this vast prolonged period of national mourning also had a very direct and negative impact on economic activity. For weeks if not months, as I saw firsthand, there was a tangible unwillingness to spend as freely, to enjoy life as unabashedly as in the years previously. It was as if much of China received some intimation of their own mortality in the wake of the Sichuan Earthquake. 

Next came an accelerated fall in property values across much of China. Alongside this, the stock market fell sharply. These two, the property and stock markets, are the main stores of wealth for many middle class Chinese. People felt poorer because they were poorer. The fall of both property and share prices wiped away billions of dollars in national household wealth. People in their hundreds of millions were suddenly poorer, as household net worth plummeted, and Chinese pulled back even more strongly from their spending. Then, in late summer, came the financial tsunami in the USA, with the credit crisis, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and the intensifying recession. 

Any basic college economics textbook – to say nothing of common sense — could foretell the next step: a fall in overall confidence levels among Chinese consumers. This further muffled already depressed levels of personal spending. 

We’re now well into the first quarter of 2009, and my own sense, after spending these last three weeks in China, is that the cumulative impact of all of 2008’s bad news is still being felt, acutely. However, my sense is that the worst may indeed be over, and that 2009 will be a year of rebuilding and reasserted economic confidence in China. 

Of course, when talking about general economic trends in the world’s third largest economy, a lot of the clarifying detail gets lost. But, we have a real sense, in our day-to-day work, of just what an extraordinarily difficult year 2008 was for even the best Chinese businesses. Our firm, China First Capital,  has focused on serving China’s middle market private Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), assisting them with capital-raising strategic M&A and other financial transactions.

Unlike traditional investment banks reliant mainly on short-term transactions, China First Capital’s role as financial and strategic advisor to Chinese SMEs often begins at early stages of corporate development and continues through the capital raising process from private equity to a successful IPO and beyond to global leadership. 

Even our strongest clients had a tough time in 2008. In one example, a business that is one of China’s leading consumer fashion brand, maintained outstanding growth last year in overall revenue, with domestic sales rising by 30%.  That’s mainly testament to the company’s no less outstanding management and brand-positioning. But, the bottom line was less stellar. Profit margins were squeezed, and the company earned half as much in 2008 as it expected to as late as July 2008. That represents a shortfall against plan of almost $6mn. That equates, of course, to having less money to invest in building on that growth rate in 2009.  

They remain a great company, and there’s little doubt 2009 will be a better year. But, when we met with them recently, the company’s financial management are still reeling from the brutal effects of 2008. If nothing else, it drives home as little else can the importance of fortifying the company’s balance sheet, which has been overly-reliant on retained earnings and short-term bank loans to finance growth. This client, like the Chinese economy, has weathered the once-in-a-generation turmoil of 2008. Better days lie ahead — my bet is sooner, rather than later.  

Private Equity and Strategic M&A Transactions in China 2009: A New Dawn

China First Capital, a boutique investment bank, releases comprehensive analysis of five key trends for 2009 in Private Equity, Venture Capital and M&A markets in China.jpg

My firm, China First Capital, just completed our annual report on Private Equity, Venture Capital and Strategic Mergers and Acquisitions in China. I had the biggest hand in writing it, so the opinions expressed are my own. My view, overall, is one of realistic optimism. China will continue to be the world’s most robust emerging market for private equity and venture capital finance, even in a very difficult global economic environment. A big reason for this is the continuing strong performance of many private SME companies in China, especially those focused on the domestic market, rather than exports. 

China First Capital has a special affinity for these strong private SMEs. They are the only companies we choose to work with. There a few reasons for this. A big one is my personal conviction that the most important predictor of a success in private equity investing is putting money into a company with a truly outstanding boss. Ideally, the boss will also be the entrepreneur who founded the company. 

You can do all the spreadsheet modeling and projections you want, but nothing else matters quite as much as the quality and drive of the leadership at the top. In many of the good Chinese SMEs, the boss is a first-class business strategist and opportunity-seeker. Give him a dollar and he’ll bring you back five. In many of China’s larger state-owned, or partially state-owned companies in China, the boss is often more a political animal, appointed to the job as much for skills as a bureaucratic infighter as for talents at managing a business. Give him a dollar and he’ll come back in a while and ask you to lend him another three. 

SMEs, no surprise, usually run circles around their state-owned competitors in China. That’s a big reason we choose to work exclusively for SMEs. Another reason: we prefer long-term partnerships with our clients rather than one-off deal-making of larger investment banks. We act as a financial and strategic advisor to Chinese SMEs in a long-term process that often begins at early stages of corporate development and continues through the capital raising process from private equity to a successful IPO and beyond to global leadership. 

Thanks to these Chinese SMEs,  China should be among the most attractive – and active – private equity investment markets in the world in 2009. Many of the international private equity firms we work with are expecting to invest more in Chinese SMEs in 2009 than in 2008. Indeed, private equity and venture capital investment in China will likely reach record levels in 2009, the report projects, with over $1 billion in new investment into high-growth Chinese SMEs with strong focus on China’s booming domestic market.

Chinese companies raising capital this year will enjoy significant financial advantages over competitors, improving market share and profitability.

The report, titled “Private Equity and Strategic M&A Transactions in China 2009”, identifies five central trends that will drive the growth in private equity and venture capital investment in China’s SMEs in 2009. They are:

  1. the drive for industrial consolidation;
  2. profit growth helping to reignite the IPO markets for Chinese companies in China, Hong Kong and the USA;
  3. increased importance of Convertible Debt and other hybrid financings;
  4. opportunities for strategic mergers and acquisitions;
  5. well-financed businesses with strong balance sheets will enjoy sustainable competitive advantage in China’s domestic market.

Here’s the report’s first section. I’ll add more of it in later posts.

 

 Overview  chinese-balance

       

Turbulence creates opportunity

2008 was a year of extremes in China. Extremes of joy and pride, during the Beijing Olympics. Extremes of sadness and shock following the Sichuan earthquake. Even the climate reached extremes, during China’s crippling winter storms early in 2008. 

Financially, 2008 was also a year of extremes. The stock markets in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenzhen rose strongly in the first months of the year, and IPOs were plentiful. By mid-year, the markets began plunging, and IPOs dried up. By year-end, Shenzhen, Shanghai and Hong Kong were all down 60% for the year. 

China’s private equity and venture capital investments followed a similar turbulent course, beginning strongly, with over $10 billion invested in Chinese companies in the first half of the years, and then the pace of new investments slowed to a crawl.   

Governments in China, the USA and around the world intervened in an unprecedented fashion to stabilize the economy and the credit markets. As we enter 2009, there is no longer any doubt that the world economy is in recession. 

The question now is when will the recovery begin and when will be a good time to begin investing again? I want to offer a personal perspective to our valued relationships, both clients and the private equity firms we work with. As Chairman of China First Capital,  Ltd, with over 20 years of experience in the capital markets, private equity and business analytics, I’ve survived my share of business cycles. One example, I was CEO of a California venture capital company during the Dot-Bust years, the last time private equity investing came to a similar standstill. Within two years, deal activity and valuations resumed their upward momentum. 

My view: the overall investment environment in China remains challenging and the effects of 2008’s turbulence are still being felt. But, 2009 will be a year of unique opportunity for private equity, venture capital and mergers and acquisitions in China. Tough times can be the best time to make money. 

Consolidation and “flight to quality”

 

 

The Chinese economy is under significant strain as 2009 begins, with growth decelerating, factories closing by the thousands and unemployment rising. Many areas of China’s domestic economy are “over-saturated”, with too many companies competing with small market shares. China is ripe for consolidation. 

In the freely competitive markets, the weakest companies will perish. The stronger competitors will be able to add market share and enjoy the virtuous cycle of increasing volumes lowering unit costs, thus boosting profits that can be re-invested to lower still further costs of production.

Chinese consumers will respond as well, and reward with more of their money the better managed companies with the most efficient manufacturing and distribution. Out of this, stronger dominant brands will emerge, and this too will push for greater consolidation.

This process is just beginning in China. China’s domestic market is huge, second only to the US. In many vertical markets (including financial services, consumer goods, distribution and logistics, retailing, fashion), each point of additional market share in China can equate to tens of millions of dollars in additional revenue.

Chinese companies are still, most often, small-in-scale relative to the size of the industries they serve, particularly in areas where private companies, rather than those with partial or complete state-ownership, predominate Strong regional companies will acquire competitors elsewhere in China to become national powerhouses.   

For investors, the opportunities will be unparalleled to back the Chinese companies that will thrive during this process of consolidation.  The winners will be able to increase revenues and profits strongly and sustainably, even in a weak economy.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

China M&A: 2008 Is A Record Year, And The Strong Growth Will Continue

snuff-bottle-21

 

Even as IPO activity all but came to a standstill in 2008, China’s M&A market reached an all-time high in 2008, with almost USD$160 billion in deals completed, according to Thomson Reuters. This makes China the biggest M&A market in Asia, for the first time ever. 

This is an important development, and I expect China’s role as Asia’s largest M&A market will continue into the future, despite the current economic slowdown. The reasons: M&A deals in China will continue to make business and financial sense. China’s M&A activity in 2008 was almost equally split between purely domestic deals – where one Chinese company buys or merges with another – and the cross-border acquisitions where Chinese and foreign firms join together – either with the Chinese firm buying into the overseas business, or the foreign firm taking a stake in a Chinese one.  

I see huge scope for growth in both areas. China’s economy, though growing more slowly now than in recent years, is still expanding. Despite its vase size (China is now the world’s third-largest economy, trailing only Japan and the US) Chinese companies are still, most often, small-in-scale relative to the size of the industries they serve, particularly in areas where private companies, rather than those with partial or complete state-ownership, predominate. China’s private sector is filled with minnows, not whales. 

The result: there is ample room for consolidation in virtually every industry. Smaller firms will continue to merge, to gain both market share and scale economies. Strong regional companies will acquire competitors elsewhere in China to become national powerhouses. 

The M&A market, more than IPO activity, tends to holds up well even during sour economic times, or when stock markets fall. As share prices drop, the lower valuations make it cheaper for acquirers to act. We had evidence of this recently in the US, where one of the biggest M&A deals of all-time was recently announced: Pfizer’s planned acquisition of Wyeth Labs. 

In China, valuations for both quoted and private companies are lower than they were a year ago. That lowers the cost of acquiring a competitor. The cheapest way to build market share, at this point in China, will often be to buy it. 

All M&A transactions have risk. Very often, the planned-for gains in efficiency never materialize from combining two similar businesses. In China, the complexities go above and beyond this. There is due diligence risk – the difficulty of getting accurate financial information about an acquisition target – and management risk as well.  Good Chinese companies are  usually owned and run by a single strong Chairman, with scarce management talent around him. In a merger, the boss of the acquired company will often step aside, leaving a big hole in that company’s management, and so making it harder for the acquiring company to integrate its new acquisition. 

How to do M&A right in China? Good deal-structure and good advice are crucial. Structure can anticipate and resolve some of the larger post-acquisition headaches. Advice is important to make sure that the price and strategic fit are right. Just as China’s SMB’s need specialized merchant banks to serve their needs in raising capital, these SMBs, as they grow, will also need competent M&A advisors to identify target companies, manage the DD, do the valuation work, help negotiate the price, and assist with post-acquisition integration. 

Last year was a strong one for M&A in China. But, the future should be even brighter, once current economic uncertainty begins to abate.  Looking ahead, I see a real possibility that China’s M&A market will overtake America’s as the world’s largest. I’m planning for my company to play a part in this.Â